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This dissertation attempts to provide an account of realism which may 
then be applied to film, both as an elucidation and as a test of the
The dissertation draws Its 
perspectives. The account : 
philosophy of art, developed in t 
of image making and reading and ' 
baaed end linguistic approaches.
count of realism from a variety of 
derived from the contribution of the 
i erms of the analysis of the process 
i then applied to film through medium
The outcome is an account of realism posited on the duel notions of 
familiarity and discovery in terms of the realist work of art, its 
creation and perception. It is an account of realism as an effect and 
as such dismisses any contents-based approach to realism.
The successful application of this account to the ease of film denies 
the essentialist notion of film which argues for a special tie between 
film and reality. The realism of the effects operating in film are 
shown to relate directly to the notions of familiarity and discovery 
as the account of realism derived in relation to the other arts 
argues.
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PREFACE
problem of realism as if it io no longer important that an adequate 
account ba given. In part tide may account for the reluctmce with 
which film was admi tted to the pantheon of the arts and the lack of 
Interest evinced by philosophers of art.
But film, in bringing representation to a previously unparalleled acme 
of realism, has taken art to the very brink of the real. Any account 
of res’-iem would have to accomodate film as the outermost limit of its 
applicability.
This dissertation is an attempt to derive an account of realism that 
nuty be successfully applied to film.
In this task I have profited enormously from ':he guidance of my 
supervisors Penny Levitt and Susan van Zyl of the departments of 
Philosophy and Communication Studies respectively, at the University 
of the Witwaterirand.
Channelling my enthusiasm for film into the strict discipline of a 
oiss«Ttatlo» h ". at no point hen an easy task. But it will have been 
s worthwhile endeavour if it oen provide the reader with a handhold on 
tiie elusive concept of realism not least as it is applied to film.
"Of all the changes of language a traveller in distant lands must 
face, none equals that which awaits him in the city of Hypatia, 
because the change regards not words, but things. I entered Hypatia 
one morning, a magnn) ia oflrrlen was rmHmrted l.p bh.ie leigoons, I walked 
among the hedges, sure I would discover young and beautiful ladies 
bathing; but at the bottom of the water, crabs were biting the eyea of 
the suicides, stones tied round their necks, their hair green vfith 
aeeweed.
I felt cheated and I decided to demand justice of the sultan. I 
climbed the porphyry steps of the palace with the highest domes, I
crossed six tiled courtyards with fountains. The central hall was
barred by iron gratings; convicts with black chains on their feet 
were hauling up basalt blocks from a quarry that opened underground.
I could only question the philosophers. I entered the great library, 
X became lost among shelves collapsing under the vellum bindings, I 
followed the alphabetical order of last alphabets, up and down halls, 
stairs, bridges, In the most remote papyrus cabinet, in a cloud of
smoke, the dazed eyes of on adolescent appeared to me, as he lay on a
nat, his lips glued to an opium pipe.
'Where ia the sage?1
Che smoker pointed out of the window. It was a garden with children's 
games: ninepins, a swing, a top. The philosopher was seated on the
lawn. He said) 'Signs form a language, but not the one you think you
I had realized I had to free myself from the images which in the past 
had announced to me the things I sought: only then would I succeed in
understanding the languages of Hypotia.
Now I have only to hear the neighing of horses and. the cracking of
!i . .
whips and I am seized with amorous trepidation: in Hypatia you have
to go to the stables and riding rings to see the beautiful women who 
mount the saddle, thighs naked, greaves on their claves, and as soon 
as a young foreigner approaches, they fling him on the piles of hay or 
sawdust and press their firm nipples a.iainst him
And when my spirit wants no stimulus or nourishment save music, I know 
it is to he sought in the cemetries; the musicians hide in the tombs; 
from grave to grave flute trills, harp chords answer one another.
True, also in Hypatia the day will come when my only desire will be to 
leave. I know I must not go down to the harbour then, but climb to 
the citadel's highest pinnacle and wait for a ship to go by up there. 
But will it ever go by? There is no language without deceit".
Italo Calvino Invisible Cities 
London: Picador 1979
/
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"The ancients built Veldrada on the shores of a lake, with houses all 
verandas one above the other, and high streets whose railed parapets 
look out over the water. Thus the traveller, arriving, sees two 
cities: one erect above the lake, end the other reflected,
u^wlJe-down. Nulhlug exloLb or liupye:i9 in the one Vuldreda that the 
other Valdrada does not repeat, because the city was so constructed 
that its every point would be reflected in its mirror, and the 
Valdrada down in the water contains not only all the flutings and 
Juttings of the facades that rise above the lake, but also the rooms'n 
interiors with ceilings and floors, the perspective of the halls, the 
mirrors of the wardrobes.
Valdrada1 s inhabitants know that each of their actions is, at once, 
that action and its mirror image, which possesses the special dignity 
of images, and this awareness prevents them from forgetfulness. Even 
when lovers twist their naked bodies, skin against skin, seeking the 
position that will give one the most pleasure in the other, even when 
the murderers plunge the knife into the black veins of the neck and 
more clotted blood pours out the more they press the blade that slips 
between the tendons, it is not so much their copulating or murdering 
that matters as the copulating or murdering of the images, limpid ard 
cold in the mirror.
At times the mirror increases a thing's value, at time' denies it. 
Not everything that seems valuable above the mirror m->‘stains its 
force when mirrored. The twin cities are not equal be ■'!. nothing 
that exists or happens in Valdrada is symmetrical: every face and
gesture is answered, from the mirror, by a face and gesture inverted, 
point by point. The two Valdradas live for each other, tKir eyes 
interlocked; but there is no love between them.
Italo Calvinc Inrlslble Cities 
London: Picador 1979
1. INTRODUCTION
'Ihis dissertation sets out to provide an account of realism in terms 
of the philosophy and history of art. The application of this account
to film will provide an elucidation of the account of realism through
analysis of the attainment of the realistic effect in this particular 
art form while simultaneously acting as a test case for the account.
Defining the provision of • account of realism as ttui analysis of the 
attainment of an effect demarcates a specific body of work as having a 
purchase on the problem of realism. This body of work is limited to 
theorists who work from the premise that realism is an effect 
generated by the relation between artist, artwork aid viewer (which 
term includes reader and listener). Limiting the relevant work in 
this way does not imply that the contributing theorists have all 
adopted the same approach to the problem of realism. In fact the 
theorists from which this dissertation draws its account of realism 
represent o variety of perspectives from which to approach the same 
problem. A preliminary account of realism is derived from (1) the 
con-ribution of the philosophy ". art, W  dnveloped in terms of the 
analysis of the process of s making and reading from an art
historical perspective, and t,,L pplied specifically to film through
!3) medium based and (4) linguistic approaches.
Film is of particular interest as an application of an account of 
realism because of the standard explanation of film’s lealiam >-\ both 
essentialist and content grounds. Cinema's so-called 1 special ?. to 
reality and the status accorded the documentary t b  the prod :fi« of 
these approaches to film. Deriving the account outsiUv • F a 
particular art form before application to film indice i '.hat 
asaentialiat accounts of realism are specifically refuteo . -.ms 
dissertation. Similarly contents baaed accounts of rr.i i . s h y  
theorists who suggest that realism is somehow related to the . • yal
applies before anything further may
claims of resemblance, copy, ill'
irtiat. The process of im&s« making and image reading
Gombrich's explanation of the realistic effect is that the viewer 
of a realist,c work finds in the familiarity of the mode of 
representation a fulfillment of his expectations such that s/he 
projects into the work the illusion of reality- If this is true 
then the part played by the viewer has a direct bearing on the 
artists attempt to achieve a realistic effect. Those effects which 
encourage the viewers 'projection' will create the illusion of 
reality. The artist arrives at these effects by a process of what 
Gombrich calls 'schema and correction1, a process of making which 
then comes to match something in 'the real world1. At the root of 
the creation of the realistic effect is the familiarity of the 
so-called schemata, corrected by the artist's discoveries of what 
fosters the viewer's projection. To ignore the role of the artist 
and the viewer is to fail to understand the importance of the 
notion of familiarity for realism insofar as that familiarity is 
created or discovered by the artist specifically to foster the 
effect of realism for the spectator.
Where Gombrich offers an understanding of the role of viewer and 
artist in the achievement of the realistic effect as delineated in 
chapter two, the actual achievement of the effect, most 
specifically in film, will be investigated in chapter five through 
semiological analysis.
The Realistic And The Cinematic
The application of this account of realism to film is introduced 
through the work of the leading realist film theorist Andre Baaitv
Film, with its mechanical recording of images and its unique 
ability to reproduce movement achieves the realist effect with an 
ease unparalleled in the other arts. Film, as a result, is 
perceived as enjoying a special tie to reality - a perception that 
has been raised to tiie status of theory. That film does not need 
to be treated as a special case will be a persuasive test of the 
account of realism derived in the preceding chapters of this
dissertation.
The work of Bazin is the outgrowth of his realist aesthetic and the
through Goodman and Gombrich wxl1 serve to clarify the contribution 
of realist film theory and introduce realism to film. The more
detailed analysis of film in terms of the account of realism will
be undertvt-vn in chapter five.
Bazin's explanation of filmic realism is a psychologies! one based 
on the viewer's conviction about the truthful nature of the
mechanical reproduction of reality in film. Film's so-called 
unique tie to reality, Bazin identifies as the viewer's convictions 
about the objectivity of the photographic process because of the 
mechanical nature of photography. Bazin then attempls to argue 
beyond this a realism deriving from the sheer re-presentation of 
spatial reality by film's mechanical mode of reproduction of 
images. Bazin fails thereby to grasp the very basis of realism - 
that it is an effect, that it is not a question of what is
reproduced but of how it is created and how it is perceived.
4, Realism And Semiology
Semiology offers the opportunity to analyse the creation and
perception of the realist film that the chapter on Sazin could not
By utilizing the work of Christian Metz to apply the method and
findings of structural linguistics to the study of film the
mechanisms behind the achievement of realism, as opposed to
non-realism, as an effect in film will be revealed. The mechanisms 
for generating realism are set out as a set of choices confronting 
the filmmaker, choices which will either enhance or detract from 
the realism of the film.
Semiology will investigate realism in terms of tripartite nature of

2. REALISM - A PRELIMINARY ACCOUNT
NELSON GOODMAN
The preliminary account of realism set out in th'.s chapter revolves 
around the basic usage of the term realism outlined by Goodman.
A. The first and moat fundamental use of realism set out by Goodman is 
its work as a differential tarm separating out 'realis'iic' from 
'non-realistic1 works of art. That this differentiation should 
take place on the basis of the familiarity of 'a standard mode of 
representation from which information Issues with ease1 .s argued 
by Goodman against the rival claims of 1)'resemblance', 2)'closest 
copy1, 3)'illusion1 and 4)1 information1 to hold the key to
representational realism.
1) The overwhelming tendency is to think of resemblance an the key
to realism. Goodman’s, by now, familiar dism.-.ssal of
resemblance from the theory of representation at the very outset 
of Languages of Art (1981) states that resemblance is neither a 
sufficient nor necessary condition for representation. It is 
not sufficier.t as resemblance, unlike representation, is 
reflexive ami symmetric (Goodman 1961 p4). Rseemblance is
reflexive becaub? c,i object resembles itself. The saimi can not 
be said of representation - an object does not usually represent 
itself. Resemblance is symmetric because A resembles B as much 
aa B ensembles A tut while a painting may represent an object 
that object can not be said to represent the painting (Goodman 
uses the word object for anything a picture represents).
For Goodman:
"The plain f&ct is that a picture, to represent an object, 
must be a symbol for it, stand for it, refer to it. A 
picture that represents - like a passage that describes - an
object refers to and more particularly denotes it. 
Denotation is the core of representation and is independant 
of resemblance" (Goodman 198L pS).
Goodman posits the notion uf representation as a symbolic 
relationship i the hopes of disengaging it from the notion of 
resemblance, but it must be pointed out that although a symbol 
is related to its object simply by a habit of association, 
Goodman1' use of the term is more correctly understood as 
coextensive with what semiology labels a sign - a unit of 
signification. The habit of association is only one dimension 
cf o sign; the sign also has a real connection to its object 
ind, more pertinent, here a relation by virtue of its similarity 
;o its object. This latter dimension of the sign is its 
iconicity. Goodman's subsumption of representation under the 
notion of denotation intentionally blurs the distinction between 
pictorial representation and verbal description so as to 
■leparate the former from the notion of resemblance but the 
iconic nature of representation can not be dismissed by this 
ploy. Pic corial representations are different from verbal 
descriptions precisely because of the iconic dimension of the 
pictorial sign. The root of this difference is the distinction 
between the naturally generated understanding of pictures as 
opposed to learned linguistic understanding.
The evidence of the psychology of pictorial perception 
contradicts the belief that recognition of pictures requires 
instruction in a convention of representation.
Hochberg and Brooks (1962) experimented with a child, almost 
never exposed to pictures, books or even labels and never 
trained to label pictures. In other words he was never exposed 
to the so-called conventions of representation: no association, 
no picture explanations, no illustrated story-telling. At the 
age of almost two the cnild was shown outline drawings, complex 
deta') drawings and block and white photographs - he succeeded 
in labeling almost all of them correctly. Successful picture
perception does not depend on age or schooling or even IQ as 
O'Connor and Hermelin (1961) showed by getting subjects with an 
10 in the bottom one percent of the population (/under 50) to 
match a selection of spoken *sr5s with outline pictures.
Choosing the relevant aspects of optic information to act on is 
a skill that developes without schooling or marked intelligence. 
But it is a developing skill - whether it requires tutoring or 
not - the skill required to extract three dimensional 
Information from a two dimensional depiction of the reality and 
yet clearly retain the distinction between the two.
Infants were trained by Bower (1964) to respond to a res.l cube 
and although this response transferred to other cubes of 
different sizes and at different distances, the infants cid not 
respond to colour slides of the cube. The conclusion reached 
was that the information for flatness is relevant to the infant 
and thus pictorial information is irrelevant, as infants are 
controlled by binocular information such as that supplied by the 
real cube. Bower's contention from further studies in this 
field (1966) is that:
"The infant's performance appeared to depend not on static 
retinal cues but rather on the information contained in 
variables, such aa motion parallax, that are available to a 
mobile organism viewing a three-dimensional array" (Bower 
1966 p90)
- hence the importance of binocular information and lack of 
response to pictorial information, As confirmation. Bower 
(1971) presented infants wihh pictures in pairs so as to 
simulate binocular information and found the Infants would reach 
for the pictured objects. No effort was made by the Infants to 
reach out to single pictures of the object.
In the case of older subjects Yonas and Hagen (1971) presented 
children (3-4 and 7-6) and adults (college students) with 
objects seen without the possibility of head-motion or binocular
perception does not depend on age or schooling or even 10 as 
O'Connor and Hermelin (1361) showed by getting subjects with an 
10 in the bottom one percent of the population (/under 50) to 
match a selection of spoken '.vordc with outline pictures.
Choosing the relevant aspects of optic information to act on is 
a skill that developes without schooling or marked intelligence. 
But it is a developing skill - whether it requires tutoring or 
not - the skill required to extract three dimensional 
information from a two dimensional depletion of the reality and 
yet clearly retain the distinction between the two.
Infants were trained by Bower (1964) to respond to a reel cube 
and although this response transferred to other cubes of 
different sizes and at different distances, the infents tid not 
respond to colour slides of the cube. The conclusion reached 
was that the information for flatness is relevant to the infant 
and thus pictorial information is irrelevant, as infants are 
controlled by binocular information such as that supplied by the 
real cube. Bower's contention from further studios in this 
field (1966) is that:
"The Infant's performance appeared to depend not on static 
retinal cues but rather on the information contained in 
variables, euuli us motion parallax, that are available to a 
mobile organism viewing a three-dimensional array" (Bower 
1966 p90)
- hence the importance of binocular information and lack of 
response to pictorial Information. As confirmation. Bower 
(1971) presented infants with pictures in pairs so ae to 
simulate binocular information and found the infants would reach 
for the pictured objects, No effort was made by the infants to 
reach out to single pictures of the object.
In the cane of older subjects Yonas and Hagen (1971) presented 
children (3-4 end 7-8) and adults (college students) with 
objects seen without the possibility of head-motion or binocular
information and then with these factors available. The subjects 
Judged the distance to the objects perfectly in the second 
instance but the three year olds all Judged according tu visual 
angle ir, tl-.ii flvst liiotoiiw. When Uie objects were replaced 
with slides the adults were unaffected even in the second 
instance which made it obvious that it was a flat surface now 
presented to them. But the 7 year olds did not wish to respond 
to depth cues once it was apparent that it was a flat surface. 
Here then is the development of the skill of perception with 
regard to pictures; from infants dominated by binocular 
information to children affected by substituted two-dimensional 
information to adults who are able to handle and ignore the 
differences between the two kinds of information, The same 
treid is apparent with regard to kinetic information so crucial 
to the infant but lesa and less important to the growing child.
Adultf have the necessary axilla to choose what rel-iv-avt, when 
presented with a picture. Elkind (1970) showed his subjects 
picmres where many objects formed another object when 
considered as parts of a larger configuration. The youngest 
subjects tend to see ons or the other, slightly older children
bee both but not simultaneously, and adults immediately see both
and the relation between them. Where Bower revealed the 
perceivers problem in coping with contradictions inherent in a 
two-dimensional portrayal of three-dimensional reality, Elkind 
revualB the conflict between the overall picture and its many 
parts, A third perceptual skill concerns the ability to cope 
with aloslns elements of e. picture. GoUln (1960, 1361) erased 
elements of outline drawings until they barely hinted at the
original picture and found that the amount of outline required
for recognition decreased gradually from young child to adult.
It is not that the children fail to see anything, merely that 
their identifications are less accurate. What is lacking is 
con-latent accuracy, not imaginative variety.
Kennedy in A Psychology of Picture Perception (1974) concludes
that Studies of children's picture perception revealad the 
following:
"First, training is not necessary for depiction to be 
mssr.inslVl, even with such abstract pictures as line drawings, 
though for the sake of consistency the pictures should be 
highly faithful to their objects. Hochberg's drawings were 
reasonably faithful to their objects - complete outlines were 
always given and some internal detail, too. Second, there is 
a skill in picture perception that involves separating the 
relevant from the irrelevan: and, ultimately, making uee of 
the total set of elements on the picture surface and :heir 
configuration. Trailing may assist the development of 
pictorial skills, but it is not necessary to train rtiildnm or 
even provide much experience with pictures in order for 
pictorial skills to emerge" (Kennedy 1974 p63).
Cross-cultural research into picture perception is the succnd 
important area of research that has bearing on the convention 
debate. Observers like Kidd (1904), Bieheuvel (1949) and even 
Segall, Campbell aVid Herskovits as lute as 1966 interpret the 
'puzzlement' on the faces of non-Western cultures when shown a 
photograph as indicating the conventional nature of the 
photograph. Kennedy is quick to point out that sue?, an 
inference ia largely governed by the observers preconceptions.
A much more simple explanation is that the subjects are seeing, 
for the first time, a curious alien artifact: the look is not 
one of incomprehension but curiosity to discover how the 1 trick' 
is achieved. Indeed, a square piece of paper with shapes on it 
is hordly likely to elicit any response at all from the viewer, 
It is much more likely that the subject can see what is pictured 
in the photograph and is puzaled by that very fact. Hardly 
conclusive evidence for the need to learn the convention in 
order to see the picture. More careful cross-cultural studies
Nadel (1937) found that his Nigerian subjects, despite a history
/
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of ’imngelesa' .irt, could cope with photographs of men, animals, 
even buahfires. He and Hudson (1967) conclude that there is no 
problem with recognition only with background to the picture or 
a-.bieul'Ua .-Icr.ionts, sucl, =o vliet pi<.o=nLed Uy frozen figures. 
In this latter respect the problem is not one of identification 
but association which will depend on cultural differences.
nereeowski U9t>8a) found cnat Zambian subjects (especially 
children) had no trouble matching photographs of toy animals 
with :he actual toys even in the case of unfamiliar animals. 
Even the evidence for line-drawings which might be considered a 
more overtly conventional representation suggests that no 
subjects even in the moat remote geographical locations fail to 
•dentify line-drawings of animals and humans fairly consistently 
Hudscn 1960, Mundy-Castle 1966). Kennedy's observation ia that 
rany cf the studies which seem to offer a degree of conflicting 
results can be dismissed as using ambiguous pictures in the 
first place or approaching subjects in circumstances unlikely to 
encourage willing co-operation (for example Black labourers in 
South Africa).
Kennedy sums up eross-cultrual research by offering the 
f')llo»ing observations 
"Anyone who hears that Hochberg's two-year-old child named 
drawn and photographed objects, without trouble or training, 
must be suspicious of claims that "primitives" see pictures as 
meaningless daubs. The fact is that in all studies moat 
subjects identified most of the depicted objects. What the 
depicted animals and men seem to be doing is another story; 
when subjects have to say where the objects are in relation to 
one another, and what the objecta are doing to one another, 
cultural diffe •ences boil up. Wild stories and
rationalizations are spun when subjects are asked to do more 
than identify the objects in pictures. The common core to 
picture perception - across poor Americans, nomadic Bedouins, 
South African labourers and well-schooled children - seems to
tia racoKni.ti.on of objects. Pec seem to recognize objects 
in coloured or black and white photographs and in line 
drawings without trouble" (Kennedy 1974 pp78-9).
In other words what the evidence suggests is that the ability 
to interpret pictures, to recognise what is depicted is 
applicable to new, previously unseen pictures without the need 
for prior instruction. That pictorial understanding is 
naturally generated has led Flint Schler to call this property 
of iconic modes of representation 'natural generativity' (Schler 
1986 p43). "Natural generativity" makes a symbol iconic. A 
lack of "natural generativity means that a natural language is 
not iconic. Pictorial understanding is naturally generated, 
linguistic understanding is not, "Natural generativit/" 
indicates that a picture resembles its depictum in that there is 
"an overlap between the recognitional abilities triggered [oy 
picture and depietum]" (Schler 1986 p!87). It is "natural 
generativity that specifies the similarities between picture aid 
depietum and the requisite amount of similarities far 
resemblance to obtain.
"It is not required that a picture should look lir.e its 
subject in any introspectably noticeable way. Moreover, whit 
it is like to see S [picture) need not be phenomenologically 
similar to what it is like to see 0 [depietum]" (Schler 1966
Thus specifying exactly what similarities are required for 
resemblance to obtain is unnecessary as the picture need not 
even look like the depietum; and establishing the requisite 
number of these similarities is unnecessary because the picture 
is sufficiently similar to the depietum if same can "naturally 
generate" on interpretation of the picture as being of the 
depietum.
Natural generativity indicates that resemblance does have a 
vital role to play in pictorial representation and Goodman can 
not employ the notion of representation as a symbolic
iroistionsnip to ignore the role of .-eaemblance or even, as he 
would have it. to act as a corrective to the prevailing 
confueian of representation with resemblance, nevertheless his 
basic thesis that resemblance is neither sufficient nor 
necessary far r**r*++nt&tluii bi-111 iioiJu ^nd resemblance, by the 
seme token, can not be the key to representational realism, tie 
must look elsewhere for this key.
If one daes not conflatr realism of representation with 'looking 
like "reality1* in any introspectably noticeable way1 then what 
is to be the criterion by which we compare the realism of any 
two pictures'? Goodman to considers and dismisses a variety of 
other possibilities.
2) Gcoiman lonsidera the injunction that
"To ifii-ke a faithful picture come as close as possible to
copying the object just as it is'' (Gnoflrasn 1591 p6).
Realism considered sa ’the closest possible copy of an object1 
is v t significantly different to the conflation of realism with 
reB-.Riblawe, However the injunction set out by Goodman brings 
into focus the problem of what an object ’Just aa it ia' could
be snd the problem of access to anything ’as it is'.
Goodman’u ’radical relativism’ asserts that there are many
very ions of world - descriptions of world given by the various 
sciences and depletions of world in the work of the artists - 
which can be right at the same time even when Irreconcilable 
{Goodman 1984 olOS), There is, according to CUwdwao, no one way 
a thing isi
"the object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complox of 
cells, a fiddler, a friend, 6 fool" (Goodman 1981 p6).
One could not copy all of the ways at once in thti hopes of 
nchievina a raoUatic picture. But by the same token there is 
rso wild separate and d^-inct from any description or depiction 
of it, we cannot compare these descriptions if we have no 
access to 'the world’, We are left only with versions. What is
I
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copied then is one of the ways an object is or looks with no 
claim to being 'the right version', the one which corresponds to
sp'tify whs*" is to be copied. Aseptic conditions, a free and 
innocent eye: these can not be suggested as 'the way' to look
at an object so as to achieve a realistic copy. Goodman rejects 
the notion of knowing os a process of receiving raw material 
through the senses - raw material discoverable through 
disinterpretation. Reception of the raw material and its 
interpretation cannot be separated. The neutral eye la just as 
biased as any other eye - it is merely a different 
interpretation and in no way closer to seeing anything 'as it 
is1. As it is not possible to decide between various 
interpretations to select the closest copy of something that 
cannot be specified in the first place, realism considered as 
'the closest possible copy' does not enable it to function as a 
differential term.
3) Goodman is as dismissive of the argument that a realistic 
picture is one that is a successful illusion, a picture that 
seems to be or have the characteristics of what it represents. 
This possibility displaces the key to realism from the object to 
th# reactions of the perceiver. This is the notion of realism 
entertained in an anecdote like Pliny's which credits Parrhotios 
with going one better than Zeuxis in producing a picture so 
realistic the viewer is deceived into thinking he is looking at 
the actual object and not a representation thereof. Although 
Zeuxis painted grapes so realistically that birds pecked at 
them, Zeuxis himself was taken in by Parrhosios' painting for 
when he attempted to lift the curtain that covered the work he 
found that it was painted.
Because it is the viewer's responses and expectations that count 
this theory does not run foul of the problems that beset the 
copy theory. But that the measure of realism comes down to the 
probability of confusion on tha part of the viewer between
representation anO representamen is not obvious or indeed 
suitable according to Goodman. The possibility of confusion 
varies from object to object, person to person; the probability 
of cor.fusisn is rarely more than nil even for trompe-l 'oeii 
painting unless carefully staged in which case even unrealistic 
pictures can be made to deceive. Goodman is clearly not 
impressed by literal confusion between the representation and 
that which it represents but would rather have it that the 
images are signs which work instantly and unambiguously to 
represent the objects but .ithout any element of confusion 
between th-» sign and that which it stands for.
The confusion between representation and representamen that it 
seems to Goodman is at the heart of the illusion theory of 
realism is however not the only interpretation of this much 
maligned theory. The confusion, such as it is, is of a 
different order in the work of Gombrich for example. His 
account is not that the realism of a picture of an object is the 
result of an illusion generated by the viewer being deceived 
into thinking that' the picture of a man is in fact the man. 
This is the explanation of trompe I'oell and does not encompass 
the lull set of works considered as realistic. Rather 
Gombrich's notion of the Illusion that attends the realistic 
picture ia that the viewer, confronted by a two dimensional 
marked surface has the 'illusion' of the real in the picture.
man and does not realise it is a picture. The 'confusion' is 
not a deception as the viewer, confronted by a canvas covered in 
brushstrokes, lends his active participation to see what is 
depicted on the canvas. The realism of the picture is that it 
gives the illusion that it is a real object in the picture. 
This is how the notion of illusion will be incorporated into the 
account of realism in the next chapter. It has no connection 
with the illusion-as-deception theory dismissed by Goodman and 
would perhaps be better served by a label other than 1 illusion1.
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4) Goodman's third rejection of a possible account of realism as a 
differential term is the argument that the more realistic a 
picture, the greater the amount of relevant information it 
supplies. Goodman insists that there is no difference in 
information yield between a realistic and an unrealistic
picture. A picture in standard perspective and one in reverse 
perspective yield the same information when appropriately
interpreted. More recently Goodman has pointed out that a 
picture which employs standard perspective but contains a number 
of errors io more realistic than one using reverse perspective 
with no errors, wbicr. .’ays a lot about greater informativeness. 
Indeed. Picasso's 'Young Girl with Blue Hat' probably supplies 
more information that Rembrandt's 'Portrait of Hendrickje 
Stoffies' does.
5) It is this latter consideration that leads Goodman to a vital 
distinction between realism and fidelity. The two pictures may
be equally correct, provide the same information but they are
not equally realistic. Fidelity is not a sufficient condition 
for realism, and here is a key to an answer. The difference 
between the two pictures is rather that while the Rembrandt is
real according to a key to its 
practiced that we are unaware o 
choosing, interpreting, the Picasst 
to read it, what interpretation 
conclusion 
information issues' 
upon familiarity, 
itself has become, 
time our exposure tc 
of representation
symbols. habitual, so 
3 of reading,
it. Goodman's 
of 'how easily 
in turn depends 
representation
realism is a question 
(Goodman 1981 p36) and this 
, standard the mode o 
This is not to say that a 
o abstract impressionism will make this mode 
so familiar we would not want to call it 
realistic. The literal or realistic or naturalistic system of 
representation is traditionally taken as standard and thus 
whether systems of representation will be accorded the status of 
'realistic' depends on how standard those systems are. An 
abstract impressionist painting, no matter how familiar it may

/between the 'many equally valid descriptions' of world which is 
entailed by a radical relativism mitigates against a realistic - 
non-realistic dichotomy. Without "the world" to help us pick 
p'li- one r'.ght vsrsion, we can only compare one description 
of world with another description. We only have descriptions of 
world - these versions are our worlds. This does not deny the 
possibility of one particular version, one particular 
description, one particular mode of representation assuming a 
familiarity such that one would regard it as the standard mode 
of representation and refer to it as realistic. The notion of 
truth cioes not enter into the equation of one mode of 
representation with realism - merely familiarity. Realism is 
not an absolute in terms of this analysis because as long as 
there is no absolute relationship between picture and object the 
mode of representation which is most realistic, the effect which 
allows information to issue most easily to the viewer, is 
established by convention. Once a particular convention is 
entrenched, the mode of representation is so habitual as to be 
regarded by the viewer as not 'merely a contention established 
by familiarity, not just an effect that has come to resemble 
what It stands for because the mode of representation Is so 
established, but as realistic.
Once this account of realism is applied specifically to film 
Goodman's case for realign as a differential term without 
employing the notions of resemblance or copy (in particular) is 
crucial. It negates any claims that could be made on the 
grounds of mechanical reproduction giving film a realism 
unattainable by a different means of reproduction. The iconic 
nature of the filmic sign can not be posited as grounds for the 
realism of the film medium if resemblance is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient condition for representation. Realism as a 
question of familiarity rather then an absolute relationship 
between picture and object serves to negate any arguments for 
the objectivity of film's mechanical reproduction. Indeed, 
Goodman’s position on a standard mode of representaion is the
very antithesis of claims for the realism of mechanical 
reproduction. Goodman claims that the familiarity of the 
standard mode of representation is an effect attained by the 
artist rather than the result of a supposed lack of artifice 
involved in mechanical reproduction via the camera.
The relationship between between art and world is the second use of 
realism outlined by Goodmani realism as discovery and revelation. 
This reflects the factor of initiative in the notion of realism as 
opposed to the inertia associated with familiarity.
"‘■h difference as to the facts', 'a discovery1, ’a revelation', 
these phrases cover many things. Discoveries have been made not 
only by Christooher Columbus and Pasteur, but also by Tolstoy 
and Dostoievsky and Freud. Things are revealed to us not only 
by the scientists with microscopes, but also by the poets, the 
prophets, and the painters" (Wisdom 1957 p!64).
Ouite evidently Goodman is concerned with revelation and discovery 
in terms of art ant; not science, but he chooses as his comparative 
example the C-.pernican revolution. The discovery of a heliocentric 
solar system by Copernicus revealed a new version of world.
Goodman recalls tie discovery of standard Western perspective 
during the Renaisscitce and the rediscovery of the Oriental mode by 
the late Nineteenth Century French painters and characterizes the 
result of these changes to the atondard mode of representation of 
these particular cultures as:
"Practice palls; and a new mode of representation may be so fresh 
and forceful as to achieve what amounts to a revelation" 
(Goodman 1984 p!27).
Goodman is certainly not subscribing to any theory of evolutionism. 
His argument is that realism is relative to s particular culture 
and the system of representation standard to our own time - "the 
traditional European style" (Goodman 1981 p37) - has no special 
claim to the title 'realism'. Although we cannot talk of realism 
evolving townrdn an absolute realism, the particular system of
representation we call realism is in a constant state of flux. 
Familiar tools are employed in new ways, in new combinations and so 
the standard system of representation changes as these departures 
from the standard picture result in 'a now degree of realism1. It 
is a new degree of realism in the sense that it is only a new mode 
of representation to a degree. It is not an absolutely new mode or 
there would be no means of comparison.
The new moos of realistic representation is a discovery in that the 
artist discovers new effects which altera the standard mode of 
representation. The new mode of representation is a revelation in 
that it reveals to us a new version of world by depicting world in
a different way. The discovery of deep focus, primarily by Orson
Welles in Citizen Kane (1940) allowed for the maintenance of the 
spatial unity of scenes, representing an episode in its physical 
entirety. The discovery of this effect replaced the standard mode 
of soft focus and the characteristic 'shot-reverse-shot' 
(alternating between characters with each speech). This departure 
from the standard practice was so successful it occasioned what
Goodman would call 'a'new degree of realism1. Bazin wrote of depth
of focus that it:
"brings the spectator into a relation with the image closer to 
that which he enjoys with reality. Therefore it is correct to 
any that, independently uf the contents of the image, its 
structure is more realistic [than montage]" (Bazin 1967 p35). 
Bazin's enthusiasm for the realism of depth of focus is indicative 
of the success of the move away from the standard mode of 
representation - it revealed a different world-verelon which was 
taken to represent reality. That we cannot join Bazin in labelling 
depth of focus es a step forward in the evolution of film language 
according to his realist aesthetic is the result of Goodman's 
relativist position which argues that there is no privileged 
description of what is seen and hence no absolutely valid 
correspondence with the facts that could pick out the single right 
version.
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the use of realism as discovery and revelation to describe the 
relationship between realistic art and world, necessarily is 
preceded by realism's use as a differential term. The notions of 
discovery anu revelation have no logical connection to realism. 
That is why Goodman is at such pains to establish familiarity as 
that which sets realist works of art apart, as opposed to the 
notion of resemblance, copy, information or illusion. Discovery is 
strictly in terms of the familiar, as it is only in terms of the 
familiar that we comprehend the new effect. The new version that 
is revealed tj us is only realistic because it is comparable to the 
version given by the prior standard mode of representation. This 
ensures the acceptance of the new version such that familiarity 
with it leads us to call it 'reality'.
That revelation could concern anything more than 'a new version' is 
denied by the radical relativism of Goodman's stance despite talk 
of true and false versions. Goodman wrote:
"we make versions, and true versions make worlds" (Goodman 1984
so the notion of 'tr_ith' here is intrinsically bound up with his 
relativist notion of 'worldmaking'. The world versions Goodman has
posited in the place of the World are made by us according to
versions. Although Goodman himself equivocates on the notion of
making, he insists that we can only make what is already there. A
constellation is created by a version, it is chosen from among 
other configurations according to a particular principle. The 
constellation was not 'always there1 because to say that all 
configurations of stars are constellations whether picked out or 
not is to say that no configurations of stars are constellations. 
But at least the stars were there before any version (before any 
person who could make a version)? No, Goodman counters, stars are 
made by drawing certain boundaries end this making is done by a 
version that 'puts the stars earlier than itself in its own space 
time1 (Goodman 1984 p36). The sense of making Goodman is employing 
here is as Aldrich points out "to make something of somett ing" 
(Aldrich 1982).
"...all the! terms of our language are interpretation laden, such 
that reference even to what seems to be simply before the
pereeiver 'makes something of it, a construction of the 
Interpretation the referring terms are laden with" (Aldrich 1982
Goedman is talking about making in this interpretative sense rather 
then meaning that we make with our hands when he talks of making 
versions. But Goodman also states that only true versions make 
worlds. Th3 obvious question about true versions is how can a 
version be wrong about a world it makes? Wrong versions can be as
coherent as right ones, nor can there tie any appeal to. anything
outside of the version - some 'absolute1. Goodman points to
validity in the case of induction: validity of inductive inference
does not require truth of either premises or conclusion, only u 
certain formal relationship between them and categorization that 
has become extended- Goodman does not only use inductive validity 
as an example of rightness but points out that inductive validity 
ia a criteria applied in the search for truth as that which is 
inductively valid is mere accepted than that which is not. Being 
accepted is not truth but ultimate acceptance is a sufficient 
condition for truth. •
"And sin'.e acceptability involves inductive validity, which 
involvss ri|;ht categorization, which involves entrenchment, 
habit must bs re-’ienised as an integral ingredient of truth ... 
For if wc make worlds, the meaning of truth lies not in these 
wri.-j.de but in ourselves - or better, in our versions and what we 
do with them" (Goodman 1984 p38).
Gooaman'a statements in this regard loosely appropriate the 
position of the pragmatists. The position of Charles Saunders 
Peirce (who will receive further attention in the chapter on 
semiology) is that propositions have meaning because they produos 
an int.erpretant (an effect on some Interpreter). Such an 
interpretant is, according to Peirce, a habit - a disposition to 
act or rsact in a certain manner under certain conditions. Thus to 
develops the meaning of a proposition it is only necessary to
detarmine "what hobit It produces" (Peirce 1936 5.400) or to put it 
another way, the beliefs it occasions - "the essence of belief is 
the establishment of a habifiPeirce 1936 5.398). The notion of 
belief which does not wiry wiUi it any notion of truth apart from 
the 'ultimately acceptable1 is the basis for the explanation of 
realism in terms of the role of the viewer, Goodman's point about 
truth is an epistemic one and is not legitimately extended into the
realm of the psychological foundations of habit. However, as the
notion uf belief has leen drawn into the discussion of habit by 
reference to pragmatv.Bm it is appropriate to translate the 
pragmatist position into Goodman's terminology, For Goodman belief 
must be the correlative of an accepted version and not of some 
absolute notion of truth. In this sense 'habit is an integral 
ingredient of truth' because that which is in the standard mode of 
representation allows for an habitual reading by the spectator, the 
ease of which persuades the spectator that it is a 'true' 
representation of 'wor.d1. This belief on the part of the viewer 
that he is looking at a true version 16 what is important to the 
notion of realism and not any question of absolute truth.
Beyond the viewer's belief, the question of truth does not enter 
into the notion of realism in the sense of revelation that led to 
this discusalon. The departure from the standard mode of 
representation that results in a new degree of realism is related 
to beliefs of the vr.ewer that the new practice renders the 
'reality' more successfully and not the discovery of that which is 
'right' tr replace a previous 'wrong'. Truth or falsity in this 
sense could not possibly be entertained by a relativist like 
Goodman, For Goodman a nonverbal aesthetic object can be neither 
true nor false as no object in itself makes any statements which
could be either true or false. A picture does not make any
assertions such as 'This Is the object1 to which one might reply 
'True, this is the objeot1 or 'False, this is not the object'. 
Rather a painting shows an object - it represents it as having 
certain characteristics. But it does not make a claim to truth - 
it is just offering the object. Comparison to 'the reality1 may
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lead the spectator to make a statement as to its correspondence to 
the 'reality'. Such a statement about the painting may be true or 
false but not the painting Itself.
In this sense Goodman derives the notion of realism as revelation 
independently of the notion of truth - it is s sense of realism 
that is concerned with the telling rather than the told. Truth in 
the telling is a matter of familiarity of symbols used end the 
truth of the told is of no concern in deriving this notion of 
realism unless it is to describe the belief of the viewer which 
provides a psychological underpinning for realism.
This is the limit of the notion of revelation derived by Goodman: 
not a step on the road to the ultimately truthful representation of 
reality but rather the making of a true version which gives us a 
new frame of reference through its particular description of the 
phenomenal (its particular mode of representation) and thus 
occasions in the viewer a new apprehension of what is represented. 
In this way the revelation associated with the realistic work of 
art goes through from the work to 'reality' itself and becomes 
definitive of the relationship of art and world.
The concept of realism as revelation is one that will vecurr in the 
chapters on Bazin and semiulugy. In both of those accounts It will 
be closely related to Goodman's third thesis on realism in relation 
to the 'told' rather than the 'telling'. The reason for this is 
that if, as is so often claimed, film does indeed have a claim to a 
special tie to reality it must lie xn the fact that the object or 
event filmed did at one time stand/play out in front of the Carrera.
The question of truth ie much more a concern of Goodman's third 
usage of realism which picks up on the distinction between the 
'telling' and the 'told' and suggests a sense in which a realistic 
representation is realistic by virtue of its subject matter. This 
is a use vital to an art like film - a recording art - which will 
argue for a special tie to reality because film records 'actual' as
I ."Bt 'v
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op; Led to 1 Imaginary' things, beings, events.
In short, a DUrer drawing of a dragon uses a standard mode of 
reoresen68tion but Is unres)tstio in its subject matter, This is 6 
use of realism that depends upon the ’told1 being actual rather 
than the 'telling1 being standard. It would appear to raise 
questions about the ontological status of the representamen and 
thus about the relationship of realism to truth of representation. 
Uniike the previous account of realism as revelation where 
revelation was related to the mode of representation irrespective 
of the truth of that representation this account of realism would 
appear to be raising questions about whether the 'told' is actual 
wnd therefore if It is a truthful representation.
The fiisr gloss of this account is deceptive. The Rembrandt 
'Portrait of Hendrickje Stoffels1 is realistic; the DUrer drawing 
of a dragon is unrealistic. The reason, or so it would seem, is 
that there is a difference ir ontological status between Hendrickje 
Stoffels and a dragon that is responsible for the fact that the 
Rembrandt la realistic and the DUrer is not, namely that Hendrickje 
Stoffels was an actual young woman but the dragon was/is 
non-existent. Truman Capote's In Cold Blood (1955) is realistic as 
it is either "taken from official records or is the result of 
interviewe with person'□ uirectly concerned”(Capote 1965) while 
J.R.R. Tolkien's The Hobblt (1937) is not realistic as it is about 
hobbles and dragons neither of which exist. In literature in 
particular this is often the most Import; '■ sort of realign - it 
may, indeed, be the only way in which certain stories are more 
realistic than fairy tales.
However this first gloss is misleading because Goodman's account is 
not so straight forward; works that are unrealistic on this 
account are not to be Identified with works representing what is 
non-existent,
"Strictly speaking, Bosch's painting (Garden of Delight] does not 
depict monsters, or the tapestries in the Cloisters depict a
1
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questions as to whether realistic works show or tell the truth 
about 'the world1. An earlier account of realism as designative of 
revei&t.ion as characteristic of the relation between 'art' and 
'world' sade no claim: as to the truth of representation of the 
realistic work of art but only referred to the making of worlds 
where the meaning of truth lies in our versions. Here, equally, 
realism is unrelated to whether the work of art shows or tells the 
truth about 'the world'. Truth or falsehood only applies 
metaphorically and of course metaphorical truth is equally 
compatible with literal truth or falsity. 'The joint is jumping' 
is evidently a literal falsity even if metaphorically Erue, 
although if ' the joint is Jumping' is literally true then 'the 
joint is Jumping' is metaphorically true. (Metaphorical falsity 
can be seen to be the literal falsity of 'the joint is jumping'). 
When applying these notions of truth to fiction one finds that 
fiction is literal, literary falsehood but that it can be 
metaphorically true. The facc that fiction is literally false does 
not mean it is nob about what is actual. But 'actual' does not 
intail any notion of truth as ti does not mean the 'actual world1 
because there is net- the world, it simply distinguishes ib from 
being about what is nonactual.
This is how Goodman can talk about a realism that is dependant on 
the told and not the telling even if the work denoted nothing 
literally - that is it is fiction.
Goodman's account of realism is anchored between the poles of 
familiarity and discovery. Although it is the familiarity of a 
standard mode of representation that differentiates the realistic work 
it is only the familiarity of one particular version of world subject 
to the Kuhnian process of replacement once it no longer 'works' for 
us, no matter how reluctant we may be to shake the habit. This 
element of change is occasioned tiy the discovery of new effects that 
reveal to us a new version and thus discovery is the necessary
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counterpart to a relativist notion of realism such as that argued by 
Joodfflsn's notion of familiarity. The third use of realism Goodman has 
drawn attention to has nothing to do with the familiarity of the 
effect or the discovery of a new effect but concerns the subject 
"!«tt«r. His point here is that even fiction may be realistic lor
although nothing is denoted by fiction it may be separated into, for 
example, real-person-stories and fictive-person-stories.
Each of these uses of realism will be further extrapolated in the 
forthcoming chapters. First Qombi'ich will make explicit the roles of 
artist and viewer in the generation and perception of the realistic 
effect. The role of habit and discovery will be closely examined 
through Gon’brich’s psychological, art historical study. Specific 
application to film will be initieted by Bazin’s arguments for film's 
revelatory function and Metz's exploration of the attainment of the 
realistic: effect in film in the chapter on semiology.
Campo San Zanlpolg
difference betneen Chiang 'ise':
the question of style - techniques discovered by
It lj only an understanding of the expectations of the society 
regarding realistic art and the realisation of this by the artist that 
can nake familiarity a functional distinction between realistic and 
non-realistic art. That realism of representation is at least in part 
a question vf Uie perceptions and expectations of the viewer and the 
artist is evident to Gombrich because:
"That we know what we see is no truer than that we see what we 
know"(Ooodmtin 1983 p!42).
Perception is not the 'innocent' mechanism that common lore suggests - 
'seeing is believing!'. First on the part of the artist, can he 
reproduce whet is in front of his eyes? The answer is simply no 
according to Gombrich, not unless he is willing to sacrifice the 
aspect of light. This is something that can only be suggested. The 
artist's tool here is the notion of relationships. The artist uses a 
technique of suggestion through conventional notations to cunvey light 
and depth. He has to transpose nol copy. Second, on the part of the 
viewer, the representational acoure.cy of the picture depends on having 
learnt the artists notation for light and depth.
Gombrich is supported in his claims by the evidence of psychologists 
of picture perception. • Kennedy’s A Psychology of Picture Perception 
(1974) offers two pertinent experiments. Gibson (1960) experimented 
with the truth of claims about ti-ompe I'oeil. Two peepholes were 
arranged, one in front of a real corridor, one in front of a 
photograph of the corridor, From the monocular evidence subjects had 
to determine which was the real corridor: both subtended the same 
angle to the eye, the edges of the photograph were not visible, the 
optic array from the photograph replicated that from the corridor. 
The result: one third adjudged the photograph to be the real corridor 
- successful trompe I'oeil even given comparison with the actual 
object, and the fact that the photograph was in black and white. 
Perhaps a technically more accurate photograph could have made the 
difference undetectable and resulted in a greater degree of deception 
but what is important in this experiment is how many viewers failed to 
make use of the differ 'es that did exist to effect a correct choice.
What must be concluded is that different subjects chose different
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details to view as being relevant. Kennedy answers that this is not 
the seme Kind of choice ac the choice between objects that might be 
represented - the choice claimed by convention theorists.
Where Rih=on meirle » picture seem like reality, Hochbsrg (1902) sat out 
to find that real differences were not detected, A relief model of a 
house, 2,5cm in depth, one colour material, sprayed from an angle to 
achieve the effect of illumination different to that of the room 
housing the model and set in a frame with a black border and covered 
with a transparent cellophane cover was constructed. When displayed 
next to a flat picture of the model subjects failed to distinguish 
between the two, taking both to be two dimensional representations. 
The relief depth was large enough to be detected and yet as in 
Gibson's inverse version of the experiment the subjects did not choose 
that detail as relevant - largely one must surmise because of the 
context of display. Kennedy concludes
"Both studies show how close an optic array from a picture can be to 
an optic array from the world in affecting perception. And both 
studies suggest that observers have to consider what is relevant in 
an optic array as well as what to do with the relevant components of 
an optic array" (Kennedy 1974 p51).
In the light of Kennedy's conclusion it can be argued on Gombrich's 
behalf that realism on the part of the viewer results from what 
convention leads him/her to consider as relevan; in an optic array as 
well as what to do with those relevant components. This is not 
dissimilar to Goodman'a standpoint: that there is no single reality
which we can perceive and which the artist attempts to copy. Rather 
there is s way we react to 'reality1. The truly accurate picture is 
then, as Goodman pointed out in the previous chapter, not the most 
perfect copy of 'reality' hut the most perfectly realised translation 
of 'reality' into that which will elicit the same reactions on the 
part of the viewer. Realism ia more the understanding of our 
reactions to the world than of the nature of 'reality' and that is 
precisely why an explanation of realism in terms of the artist's and 
viewer's expectations is central to a successful account of realism.
/
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The key to such an account of realism Is the subtle interplay between 
what Gombrich cells the viewer's 'mental set' and the 'scheme and 
correction' proceso of artistic creation.
The concept of 'mental set1 is explicable as the viewer's expectations 
of a worK of art which determines what is seen. Because
"our reactions and our taste must of necessity differ from that of 
past generations"(Gombrich 1980 p51) 
this mental set is not constant acroiiB time. As the viewer's mental 
sec changes so the conventional not.atlon of the artist changes in 
order to retain comunicatlon. in thin way art of past generations may 
lose Its realism as the artist's style no longer coincides with the 
audiences expectations, with whet thu viewers regard as realistic. 
Once an adjustment of men tel set is required to decipher the works 
they no longer fall into the category defined as realistic by virtue 
of their leek of familiarity, For example Egyptian art made use of 
stereotypical images, modified only where the artist wished to convey 
clear distinctions such aa chat betweon men and women, achieved by the 
use of different colours,or betwuen commoners and royalty, achieved by 
a profile alteration, 'These distinctions are no longer familiar to 
the present day viewer whose mental eut is more closely aligned to the 
ureek rejection of the purely conceptual function of art. In other 
words, when the modern viewer with a realistic mental set looks at an 
Egyptian work vf art hn wants to know things about the objects 
represented which «ere not regarded Bb functions of the image by the 
Egyptians. The modern viewer wants to know if Egyptian men end women 
were different colours, if commoners and royalty had different 
profiles, but this is no more valid than wanting to know if the pawns 
on a chessbeord are all bald. The requirements for a pawn to function 
as a piece on a chessboard, the requirements for an image to function 
as a representation of a male or a king in an Egyptian work of art do 
not coincide with the expectations of of a modern day realist mental 
set. The lack of familiarity that is coincident with this 
IncompBtabllity of mental sets is at the root of the non-realism of 
art of a past age, like the Egyptians, for the modern viewer.
The changing mental set of the viewer Is paralleled by an evolving 
creative process on the part of the artist who is involved in the 
discovery of new effects to generate realism according to the viewer's 
shifting expectations. The artist is liV.e the viewer of course, in 
that he m o  13 born iatu a pai-UculBi- time and culture which gives him 
a particular mental set. Like the viewer, he equates familiarity with 
realism, and that which is familiar is that which ha can draw already.
Gombrich refers to these familiar 'sources1 as schema;
"the first approximate, loose category which is gradually tightened 
to fit the form it is to reproduce" (Gombrich 1980 p64).
These are forever changing as familiarity with our world expands and 
the legacy of existing representations increases. Nevertheless, there 
is at any one moment an existing set of schemata which determines the 
artist's output. Schemata have their influence on the organization of 
perceptions'. the mind assimilates experiences in terms of what is 
familiar. What is portrayed may look very different starting with a 
different set of schemata. Schema may indeed present an obstacle to 
more effective portrayal. But the artist can not want to paint 
outside of the limitations of a particular system as he does not know 
it is possible. The rtslism of the artist's output is relative to 
this particular set of schemata and relative to the mental set (of 
artist and viewer/ contingent on this set of schemata. From the 
schemata through a process of correction the artist can discover 
effects which will fulfill the expectations of the viewer of s realist 
work within 6hd llmitt of the particular set of schemata available to 
viewer anti artist.
"The discovery of appearances was due not so much to a careful 
observation of nature as to the Invention of pictorial effects" 
(Gombrich 1380 p279).
The ideal for perception on the part of the realist artist can not be 
the passivity usually equated with objectivity. Experimentation, 
trial and subsequent simplification are the cornerstones of progress - 
progress Cowards equivalences which enable us to see reality in terms 
of an image and vice versa. They are equivalences of response to 
relationships irrespective of likeness| it is s question on an overall 
effect rather than any particular feature, This is why some
Aphotographs of a person seem to 'work' and others not.
Acknowledging the existence of a particular set of expectations in Che 
viewing public and the artist's need to fulfill those expectations in 
order co Generate realistic art does not set up the possibility for 
realism in te.-ms of psychology. This is to be understood in terms of 
what Gombrich labels 'making and matching'. Contra the Platonic 
notion of a pre-existent ideti which is replicated by the artist,
O.-T.brich formulates the artistic process as one of making first and 
then matching. The maker of a snowman, for instance, makes something
out of snow until a man can bo seen. It is not as if there was a
pre-existent snowman. Gombrich here is employing the Popperian notion 
ot the undifferentiated mass which man learns to articulate f.->r
himself rather than a theory of generalization from what is contained 
in reality to form an abstract idea. The point of the explanation of 
the artist's procedure is what it explains about the role of 
psychology in the achievement of realism in terms of both the artist 
and the viewer. Central to the understanding of this explanation is 
the notion of ‘projection1: the projection of a familiar form into
other vaguely similar shapes. Numerous projections may be tried but 
once one seems to fit it becomes stjck, or at any rate rather 
difficult to dislodge. It has passed the test for consistency and 
those readings that make the most sunse have been chosen. Projection 
Is not usually a process of which the vi-swer or artist is aware as it 
is performed so frequently it becomes automatic, What this amounts 
to, Gombrich contends, ia that culture teaches the viewer to seek for 
an intention behind the presentation in order to find the appropriate 
response. Basically this amounts to an alignment between the artist 
and the viewer. Projection is a phase in the process of Intaractiotx 
between making and matching.
On the one hand the artist in the process of making projects an image 
Into the initial form with the possibility of further revision to 
allow for more comprehensive projection. The artist's experience is 
paralleled by that of the vizier who is involved in the same process 
of making and matching. The viewer adapts the artist's creations as
schema for his own images. The artist's 'suggestions' are matched by 
the viewer's projection-. The viewer too becomes the maker, searching 
his/her mind for and projecting memories into the work.
Artist or.d viewsl' alike at a involved in the process or making, 
employing the available schemata, correcting them until they can 
project an image into the schema and the more successfully this 
matches their expectations, the more realistic the work will be 
deemed.
The consequence of such a psychological theory of realism is to 
undermine the notion of a so-called 'innocent eye' as a prerequisite 
for realistic representation. The artist’s perception is essentially 
active: s/he looks for things, conditioned by her/his expectations,
If the artist did not actively look for something s/he would not 
notice it. The artist has the task of making, matching and remaking 
until her/his portrayal is not the victim of a passive acceptance. 
The viewer and the artist are involved in inventing comparisons which 
work according to their expectations - the very opposite of an 
innocent approach, consciously forgetful of what is already known. 
For example, apparently we are all inclined to underestimate the 
foreshortening of a disc when viewed from an angle. We have learnt to 
recognize and classify the object from Its front view. We in fact 
have such strong expectations in our search for know1 edge that we 
experience prior to the actual stimulation. We anticipate the 
roundness of a disc. As for the size of the object remaining 
constant, that is our habit of picturing an object in a standard 
setting, If its a small object perhaps that would be how big it looks 
in my hand even though it would quite obviously look much smaller 
lying on the floor across the room, Our imagined standard distances 
are what govern our set. i of depiction.
There is a sense in which the artist tries to remove his knowledge of 
things - and this is to replace the familiar meaning with a new one so 
as to better be able to assess an object's appearance and attempt to 
find a match in his medium. But no amount of suppression of meaning
Afrees either the viewer or the artist from the effects of 'optical 
illusions'- These 'illusions' demand Che very opposite of an 
'innocent eye' - they '•emend a knowledge of how the juxtaposition of 
shapes and colours afi • each other. These relationships must be 
kept in rind in srdur to find the equivalent, of the original. Copying 
appearances is not possible unless first given something to be made 
V e something else - make and then match. The task of matching could 
not be achieved without th vledge of relationships and thus the
task of achieving an 1 Innoce.. .ye' is invalidated. Rather the artist
is engaged in affirmative interpretation - he is a man aware of 
ambiguities.
"Only in making things and trying t’> meku them like something else 
that man can extract hie awareness of the visible world" (Gombrich 
1960 p264).
For the beholder, memory and experience must be mobilized to read this 
image. And interestingly enough this memory is a memory of pictui s 
already seen: hence the stability of an ar; which demands a picture 
already seen to account for a subsequent one. This is us true for the 
pa‘iter engaged in making and matching as it is for the beholder who
seeks to Be reminded of the paintings he loves. This is Wtilflin's
(1952. notion that all paintings owe more to other paintings than to 
observation. Thus it la only experimentation that can release the 
artist from the confines of style, to make, match and then remake in 
the search for greater realism. But that experimentation falls within 
certain limits or else it will Ue unintelligible - the realistic image 
is a very specific configuration of relationships
"Language grows by introducing new words, but a language consisting 
only of new words and a new syntax would be indistinguishable from 
gibberish" (Gombrich 1980 p274.
Realism is not -.bout the ' innocent eye' but about using art to probe 
reality and make a real visual discovery which seems to generate the 
idea that it is nature that imitates art.
The account of realism which confers on both artist and viewer the 
role of maker and matcher, provides a clarification of what may appear 
to be a contradiction of Goodman's position in Gombrich'a equation of
realism with illusion. The fact is that Gombrieh's notion of illus 
has nothing to do with Goodman s understanding of the term which 
to Goodman's outright rejection of it from his account of realism.
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that maximizes our tendency to project and for the illusion to be
complete with no possible contraoictory information. A further 
example he draws from the 'trick1 of perspective. It is his thesis 
that perspective is not just ;i Fifteenth Century scientific convention 
but actually valid even though the persoectival image requires tne 
beholders co1 Mboratlon. Tie fact is that just looking does not nao-y 
what is the!' . out' expectations will merely condition a guess as V,
what we see - tha" is the most f niliar interpretation. In fact "a
correct rendering ol perspective may stand for an infinity of shapes 
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3 merely claims that one can 
read the picture in the same way as one reads ’reality1. It is a 
question of the vi,= looking like the other ana not an explanation of 
how we see things (in this light the curvilinear argument is 
ridiculous: if all straight lines look curved, then the painter who 
paints curves will create the appearance of even greater curves).
Perspective is a compelling illusion where it draws upon the 
expectations and assumptions of the beholder Perspective work? on
those who know the conventions. The development of shading further 
reduces the ambiguity of an image, and through the consistent 
interaction of clues the illusion is complete. By viewing an image in 
context consistency is enhanced and ambiguity is unlikely - this is 
due to our assumed constancy in our changeable world. We have certain 
experiences which to modify our guesses. Once more a process of 
schema and correction. Artists have gradually learnt to simulate this 
consistency of clues upon which we make our gt esses - hence the tromp 
i'oell paintings of past generations. The trompe 1'oeil is
interpreted as the ’real" world' with no contradictions to prevent the
illusion - paradoxically it achieves a new height of visual ambiguity.
It is of course very rare to see such a picture in the perfect
conditions for the illusion - just to move is to spoil the illusion.
What the trompe 1'ceil ignores is 
his imagination, in transforming, 
illusion is too complete. For th 
generates increased ambiguity and 
his elements.
;he part if the beholder in using 
'his pleasure is eliminated if the 
artist the perfection of illusion 
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The final revolt against this ambiguity is the rise of Cubism which 
forces one reading of the picture: as a coloured, man-made canvas. 
This is achieved by reversing the tricks of the illusionists: 
generating an inconsistency of clues, at. incoherency of image. Due to 
an inability to transform it the viewer is unable to attach any one
interpretation no matter how hard s/he tries. Even coherent forms are 
lost in ambiguities which can not be sorted out. The viewer is 
eventually forced to accept the flat pattern. The artist actively 
prevents the interpretation of his marks aa repr«aent»ti.on - there are 
no fssiUar sbjccts or patterns even if
"few of (the artists) realise that they can drive into the desired 
identification, only those who know how to apply the viewer's 
traditional consistency te-ts and thereby discover the absence of 
any meaning except the highly ambiguous meaning of traces" (Gombrich
It will be apparent from the foregoing that the notion of illusion as
an explanation for realism as offered by Gombrich has nothing to do
with confusion or deception as Goodman would define the term. In fact
it provides an explanation in terms of the artist and viewer of the
familiarity and discovery Goodman argued was the key to 
representational realism. Referring to trompe I'oeil painting, 
Gombrich states that the increased ambiguity generated results in the 
artist losing control of his elements. Realism has rather to do with 
a lack of confusion - the familiar in short. His carefully proffered 
version of illusion is the 'illusion' of the real in the picture: an
illusion creatPd in part by the artist who guides (often more through 
what he does not say than what he does say) and in part by the 
percoiver who projects (imagination, experience, expectation). This 
is an illusion that depends ua a knowledge of conventions, not a
confusion as to vhat one is looking at. It is not for the realist
artist to confuse or deceive but to create a work according to the 
most standard conventions of his society that corresponds with the 
experiences, fulfills the expectations and encourages the imagination 
of the viewer because it is so read;ly 'readable'. It is readable 
because the mode of representation standard and the information 
therefore issues from it with a certain ease, to use Goodman's 
terminology. The viewer who sees a painting as realistic is not the 
victim of a contusion, he is not under the illusion he is seeing
reality. As I have already pointed out there is no question that
having the illusion has to be visually indistinguishable from the

4. THE REk'.ISTXC AMD THE CINEMATIC 
ANDRE BAZIN
For the first time in this dissertation the discussion moves 
explicitly to the application of the concept of realists to film. 
Deriving this concept of realism in relation to the arts in general 
and then applying it to film suggests that film does not require a
notion of realism as distinct from the broader spectrum of arts.
However the nature of film gives it a special place in the debate on
realism for a number of reasons, The first reason would be one of
technical procedure - the mechanical recording of images - which gives 
film its so-called 'unique' tie to reality, That this in part is 
shared with photography is not of any particular theoretical 
importnnce, in fact in the period of film's history when theorists 
were concerned with demarcating cinema's place in culture there was an 
impetus towards separating cinema from photography or any notion of 
mere copy theory. In .other words film's nature as a mechanical 
recording of images was seen to be Inimical to its status os an art. 
The mechanical nature of film does however have a certain relevance to 
the question of realism because of the role of the spectator in the 
generation of the realistic effect as suggested by Oorobrich. The 
special tie between film ana reality that it is argued is unique to 
film is based on what could bn loosely labelled a psychology of 
realism, the spectator's tendency to regard the sequences of images 
films offer them as 'realistic', based on the spectators 
preconceptions about the accuracy of mechanical reproduction.
Another reason that film occupies a special place in the debate on 
realism is that unlike many other arts the realist effect is achieved 
with consumate ease while the reverse is true of attempts to undermine 
realism. It was only in the later stages of the Renaissance that 
realism was conceptualised as an aim of the visual arts and both
X
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painting/sculpture and literature have fostered anti.-reali.st schools, 
like the modernists end Epic Theatre has distanced drama from realism. 
(It is not certain Mow music or architecture could strive towards the 
realist effect). But the cinema with its mechanical recording of
earliest days elicited squeals from an audience threatened by an 
approaching train and it is only on the fringes of the industry that 
there is an anti-realist tendency. This may well be, in part, a 
result of the mode Of production - it is as I say an industry - but it 
also reflects the ease with which realism is achieved by film and how 
the reverse is true of anti-realism. The achievement of the effect of 
realism (and indeed of non-realism) will be the focus of the chapter 
on a semiological approach to film. The application of the linguistic 
model to film will indicate how film’s ready attainment of the realist 
effect vindicates the concept of realism derived in the first chapters 
of the dissertation.
The notions that film has a natural affinity with 'the real' and that 
it has a unique tie vith reality were adopted by ths filmmakers of the 
realist tradition as an imperative to bring the spectator to see’’the 
world as it really is'.• This notion of the social function of film 
art is wl.at underlies Grierson’s beliefs concerning the aims of his 
British dcv.umentary film movement:
"We oPlieve that the cinema's capacity for getting around, for 
ob'Mvlng and colccting from life itself, can be exploited in a new 
and vii’al art form ... We believe that the original (or native) 
a.stor, and the original (or native) scene, aru better guides to 
screen interpretation of the modern world ... We believe that the 
materials and the stor- ts thus taken from the raw can be finer 
(moca real in the philosophic sense) chan the acted article". John 
Grierson, founder of the British documentary film movement ( Hardy
Similarly Dziga Vertov proclaims the virtues of his Kino-Eye on the 
basis of the alternative they offer to the opiate of entertainment 
films - a cinema with a conscience true to our everyday world and our
3-Bye Groups (Vertov 1964,)
artform with the responsibility of bringing
through the investigation of reality. Lastly,
offered by filmmakers of what they parcel'
Siegfried Kracauer
like Siegfried Kracauer's Theory of Film: 
Reality (1960), It is Kracauer'a belief
I
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her as the subject of an art work. However in a film featuring 
Marilyn Monroe our interest is in Marilyn Monoroe herself, it is 
Monroe we want to see. It is the function of the filmmaker to choose 
the most suitable techniques to explore most clearly a particular 
anhmlity. If this involves a degree of ti-emsfunnafcion, this is 
discounted by Kracauer: photography is almost a given part of nature 
and so one doesn't have to concern oneself with questions of 
difference between visible reality and filmed reality.
Reality surrenders naturally to the filmmaker who should never try to 
make us aware of the form at the expense of the content. For Kracauer 
the essence of film ia to be found in its content. This is not really 
an argument so much as s prescription which amounts to: - photography 
ssn recirti reality, therefore it must. And as film is the heir to 
photography, i.t must also. In addition Kracauer found himself unable 
to say very much about "reality" ns he perceived that 20th Century man 
no longer knows what It is. Ml he could do was pain'; to the affinity 
nature has for film and the 'tendency' in man to attend to nature 
rather than his own imagination - this he called the 'cinematic 
approach'. In fact, Kracauer argued, the cinematic approach could 
accommodate formalism - as long as it saved
"The medium's substantive concern with our visible world" (Kracauer 
1960 p38).
Anything more would be to lose the unique character oJ' film as an art. 
It is a question of 'balancs' (Kracau-sr 1960 p39) between documentary, 
which Kracauer saw as falling short of the cinematic Ideal, snd art. 
The fulfillment of this ideal was accomplished by a genre he labelled 
"the found story".
"When you have watched for long enough the surface of a river or a 
lake, you will detect certain patterns in the wvter which may have 
been produced by 6 breeze or some eddy. Found stories are in the 
nature of such patterns. Being discovered rather than contrived, 
they are inseparable from films animated by documentary intentions. 
Accordingly they come closest to satisfying that demand for the 
story which reemerges within the womb of the non-story film'" 
(Kracauer I960 pp265-6).
The films of Robert Flaherty (Wanook of the Morth(1922), Wan of 
Aran(lS34), Louisiana 3tory(1948)) and the Italian Neo-Realists like 
De Sica (The Children are Watching Us(1942), Bicycle Thieves(1948), 
Umberto D(1952)) and Rossellini (Rome Open Clty(1945). Pais&(1947), 
Germania, anno 8aru(1947)) are classic examples of this genre. These 
are films where the plot is drawn from actual events even if the 
individuals portrayed in the film never existed. The characters are 
essential as they provide a human dimension which will ensure the 
realism of the filmed event by involving the spectator in the
situation emotionally.
These remarks are not the point of Kracauer's position merely the 
consequence of that thesis. As such they reveal the arbitrariness of 
a thesis which suggests that Italian Neo-Realist films are more 
cinematic than German Expressionist films, or that Robert Flaherty is 
more cinematic than Kenneth Anger.
J Dudley Andrew characterizes Kracauer's thesis as a three point
argument:
"(1) That cinema is more a product of photography than of editing or 
other formative processes; (a) That photography is first and
foremost a process tied to the objects it registers rather then a 
process transforming those objects; and (3) That cinema must
therefore serve the objects and events which its equipment allows 
it to capture, that is, that it should be formally ., .realistic 
because it is imagistically realistic" (Andrew 1978 p!29).
The first two Andrew dismisses as premises, unprovable and as easily 
replaced with formalistic ones. The third is a conclusion drawn from 
the first two and this is where the real problem lies. Even theorists 
who accept Kracauer's initial 'assertions' mut-t be critical of the 
strange conclusion he draws from them. Kracauer may have shown how the 
medium of film can be used realistically, he may even have shown how 
important this is 't in no way does it follow that all films must be 
realistic to be cinematic. It is furthermore a shortcoming of 
Kracauer's thesis that it does not provide the subscriber with the 
means of differentiating a realistic from a non-realistic film.
1967 p7l) and
philoaphical aesthetics and semiology).
mathematical demonstration. Without any doubt, the
affirmation of the objectivity of
cinema's special tie to reality, how is it any less conventional than 
any other art?
This axiom grew directly out of his experience of the film medium, or 
mure specifically a particular era of filmmaking. Not that Bazin's 
theories should be seen as locked into that era and not applicable 
outside of a specific genre. Bazin is concerned with film in general 
not with particular films, Bazin was writing at a particular stage in 
film’s history end his work is a response to the specific input of 
that era. But. that response is not outside of the broader context of 
film history. Basin himself in "in Defence of Mixed Cinema" 
identified three eras of film scenario.
(i) The first, from MSliSs to the First World War, is one of diverse 
scenarios, each producer using cinema for something different (peep 
Shows, music hall, theater, serial, magic ,..).
(ii) The second era starts with Griffith - a period of a formalized
system of conventions: everything from subject to length to narrative
structure came under a rigid system. A standard style had been 
acopted to reach vast audiences who 'went to the movies' (good, bad or 
indifferent! probably more often than going to church (the modern 
ec.uivalent would probably be watching television - sheer ritual). The 
audience in fact demanded this single language, which as time went by 
became virtually the only language. The outcome in terms of subject 
matter was to denature everything from Shakespeare to Diokens - all 
reduced tu Hollywood formula. But of course there were those who 
refused the formula, saw a different relation of language to material 
- filmmakers like Flaherty and Stroheim who Investigated their 
material. Their language did not have its roots in an a priori
formula but derived from the particular film being made. Here are
Bazin's champions of realism,
(ill) The third era is the vindication of these men. Renoir's The 
Rules of the Game(1939) and Welles' Citizen Kane(1940) opened the way 
for aultiplb styles expressing the multiple aspects of reality. 
Material dictates style (or at least attitude to material) - thus no 
more cinema, Just films. In the case of novels it was no longer a 
case of restructuring to smoothly fit the Hollywood machine but rather
a unique adaptation for experiencing a cultural object through cinema 
not as cinema. Basin talks of Robert Bresson's adaptation of 
Bernano'e Diary of a Country Priest(195l) as achieving "a dialectic 
between literature and cinema ... giving us the novel, so to speak, 
mulHnV.»4 by the cir.efla"(Ba;ir. 1071 pl4Z). ;i« iuoiaLa "it is not a
question of being faithful to the original because to begin with, it 
Is the novel"(Bazin 1971 pl43) presented in a different way. Writing 
today Bazin may have offered Coppolla's adaptation of Conrad's Heart 
of Darkness(1902) as Anocal.ypse »ow(1979) - a 1970's Kurts reads from 
T.S. Pilot's The Hollow Men(1955). a poem Eliot subtitled "Mista Kurts
While it is correct to say that to explore the essays of Bazin is to 
concentrate on Renoir, Flaherty, the Neo-Realism genre of the post war 
era (De Sica, Rossellini) and the depth of focv.s technique pioneered 
by Welles and Funoir, it must not be assumed thet th-ise are his 
specific concern. Rather they are the illustrations of what Rohmer 
calls Bazin's centra.’ axiom. Thus despite new genres and new 
techniques Bazin's principles can still be applied. 7/hat I have said 
deserves at least one qualification pointed out by Bftaln'n biographer 
Dudley Andrew:
"Film is n»e mathematics. One does not begin theorizing about it in 
the abstract" (Andrew 1976 pl05)
In vther words the initial impetus for Bazin's theory was derived from 
these films specifically (Da Sics's Bicycle Thieves(194S), Welle's 
Citizen Kens(1940)..■) even If it was then found to apply beyond the 
specific genres and techniques employed by these film-makers. This 
consideration apart, Bazin's specific choice of examples would not 
appear to have much bearing on our discussion.
In order to evaluate Bazin's axiom it is necessary to identify the 
philosophical schools out of which his convictions grew. Two 
philosophical schools underlie Bazin's writings.
The first school influenced Bazin's views on cinematic realism. This 
is the secondary influence determining his theories about the
itology Of
hotoeraphie Imaet
Malraux's Voices of Silence(1953), Working
boiiy forth" (Kalreux 1360 p80);
rea." (Malraux 1960 p.108) (The Romans would go beyond illusior
cinematograph (1895). Photography
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"If the hist-— the plastic arts is less a matter of their 
aesthe eir psychology then it will be seen to be
essenti. -y of resemblance, or, if you will, of
realism" (Bazin .
""hotography is cleai'ly the most important event in the history 
of the plastic arts... Paintings being confronted in the
mechanically produced image with a competitor able to reach out 
beyond Baroque resemblar.ee to the very identity of the model, 
was competed into the category of object. Henceforth Pascal's 
condemnation of painting is itself rendered vain since the
photograph allows us on the one hand to admire in reproduction 
something that our eyes alone could not have taught us to love, 
and on the other to admire painting as a thing in itself whose 
relation to something in nature has ceased, to te the
justification for its existence" (Bazin 1967 pie).
For Bazin the solution to the problem of psychology in artti comes 
not as a result of increased realism but from a new ■way of
achieving realism:
"Photography and thfe cinema-.. are discoveries that satisfy once 
and for all in its very essence, our obsession with realism... 
[but] the essential factor in the transition from the Baroque to 
photography is not the perfecting of a physical process
(photography will long remain inferior to painting in the
reproduction of colour); rather does it lie in a psychological 
fact, to wit, in completely seti.sfyii 2 our appetite for illusion 
by a mechanical reproduction in the making of which man plays no 
part. The solution is not to be found in the result achieved
but in the way of achieving it" (Bazin 1967 pl2).
Basin’s point is that psychologically speaking, raalism is not a 
question of accuracy in reproduction but one of how the work was 
produced. A painting is a product of an artist: his skill, his 
perception... A photograph is purely a physical object like that 
which it reproduces. It is a question of ontological status:
"The objective nature of photography confers on it a quality of 
credibility absent from all other picture making... We are 
forced to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced, 
euvuiaVely re-presented, set before us, that is to a ay, in time 
and space. Photography enjoys a certain advantage in virtue of 
this transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction" 
(Bazin 1967 ppl3-14).
This conclusion about realism as a question of ontological status 
which forces the viewer to accept as real the existence of the 
object reproduced stems directly from Bazin's reading of Sartre's 
theory of the role of the image in art. Sartre’s'theory was that 
yll image-making must be an intentional act of consciousness. This 
Lbvlously presents a problem for 'photographic art' - Malraux felt 
*hat copying automatically was a mechanical process which could not 
invest the referent with an aesthetic presence, for a photograph to 
ganerdte a ‘sens' it would have to be intentionally composed; a 
film would have to be highly edited to put it in the realm of 
derealised time and space. Anything less would be 'uninspired' and 
'poor' providing only'a referent without drawing our feelings into 
mat world. Useful but without an aesthetic dimension. A 
pnotograph may signify a woman, the Mona Lisa has the 'sens' of tho 
whole Renaissance. It was at this point that Bazin would have to 
abandon these thinkers who tended to use painting as a model for 
f-lm aesthetics. For Sartre film had to transcend its mechanics 
and become invested with the creative intentions of the 
consciousness structuring it. For MaJ-oux the physicality of film 
image had, by means of montage - the realm of the structured end 
intended, to become a more spiritual process. Both seek to deny 
the medium that which is aosolutely fundamental to it so as to 
conform to the aesthetics of painting which inform us that nothing 
is worse than a mechanical reproduction. For Basin, it was the 
technological breakthrough in mechanical reproduction that gave to 
film its true nature as the medium of the real- it had not to adapt 
for it had no precedent.
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"Can the photographic image, especially the cinematographic 
Image, be likened to other images and in ccmmon with them be 
regarded as having an existence distinct from the object? 
Presence, naturally is defined in terms of time and space. 'To 
be in the presence of s^neone' is to recognire him as existing 
contemporaneously with us and to note that he comes within actual 
range of our sense ... Before the arrival of ... cinema ... the 
plastic arts (especially portraiture) were the only 
intermediaries between actual physical presence and absence. 
Their justification was their resemblance which stirs the 
imagination and helps the memory. But photography is something 
else again. In no sense is it the image of an object or person, 
ix-re correctly it is its tracing. Its automatic geresis 
''ttitinsuishes it radically from the other techniques of 
reproduction. The photograph proceeds by means of the lens to 
the taking of a veritable luminous impression in light: - to a 
mold. As such it carries with it more than mere resemblance, 
namely a kind of identity... It mskee a molding »f the object as 
it exists in space and, furthermore, makes an imprint of the 
duration of the object" (Basin 1967 pp9<3-7).
Bazin is seeking for the photograph a psychological power deriving 
from the fact that its referent at one time stood in exactly that 
position while tne camera made its "deathmask". Cinema
"relays the presence of the person reflected in it - but it is a 
mirror with a delayed reflection, the tin foil of which retains 
the image" (Bazin 1367 p97).
Where Sartre and Malraux see only duplication of accidental 
appearances, Sazin detects unique virtue:
-'All the arts are based on the presence of men, only photography 
derives an advantage from his absence. Photography affects us 
like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snow flake whose 
vegetable or earthly origins are an inseperable part of their 
beauty" (Bazin 196'’ pl3).
The effect of realism for Bazin is at least in part the 
psychological power the cinema enjoys because of its existential
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connection with the reality it represents or what semiology will 
call the indexical dimension of the image. That the cinema does 
enjoy such a psychological power is undeniable but the legitimacy 
uf Uie claims uhac underly the spectators convictions do not 
withstand closer scrutiny and so can not be elevated to the status 
of a unique tie cinema enjoys with reality. Bazin's statement that 
phonography derives its advantage from the absense of man - which 
he suggests is some guarantee of its realism - <s indicative of his 
faith in the objectivity of the photographic pru. s (he is not so 
naive as to believe it is the same as objective reality I. But as 
the semiclogical investigation of film will show, each and every 
shot is selected by the filmmaker from all other possible coherent 
shots and combined by the filmmaker with other shots in any one of 
numerous possible sequences. In other words the artist is not 
absent fiom the photographic process end whether the outcome is 
realistic is not guaranteed by some blind faith on the part of the 
viewer in the camera's objectivity but is rather a careful 
contrivance on the part of the artist. As argued by Gombrich his 
selections and combinations must evoke the correct response in the 
viewer to enjoy the psychological power of 'cinematic realism'. 
TalK of realism is talK about an effect as detailed at length in 
the chapter on Gombrich and not talk about film's unique claims to 
boint; the medium of Che real. None of this is a denial of cinema's 
psychological puwer, indeed The effect of realism is dependant on 
the viewer's convictions concerning 1 cinematic reality1 and, what 
Gombrich labelled, his/her consequent projection.
Bazin's 's-.n' is to fail to distinguish between a viewer's beliefs 
concerning 1 truth' and the question of rightness. Bazin can not be 
satisfied with the unique psychological power of realism enjoyed by 
cinema such that
"A very faithful drawing may actually tell us more about the 
model but... it will never have tho irrational power of the 
photograph to bear away our faith" Bozin 1967 pl4).
His theory of realism serves the ultimate goal of discovery of the
their 'duration, freed from their destiny;
corruytLvu" (Satin 1967 plA).
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theories it will become apparent how his arguments work towards the 
fulfillment of his philosophical bias rather than a philosophical 
justification of the realist aesthetic.
One obvious influence on Bazin's views on oinematic realium is the 
culturally orientated magazine Esprit - a prime locus for 
Bergsonlan criticism. In effect Bazin was a child of Bergsonien 
and not positivist education. Bergson held that perception, 
rationality and intuition were the three modes of apprehending the 
world. Perception is the most basic: our body encountering other 
objects in a field perpetually in flux. Reason organises these 
perceptions into comprehensible patterns while intuition, 
transcending both, reunifies experience that has beer, fragmented by 
intelligence, The latter is a return to the flux through 
supranational reflection, capturing the meaning and direction of 
the flux. 'Grasping' a melody ie this intuitional grasping of 
meaning in flux as a global experience closed to analysis, Bazin's 
Bergscrian roots are explicit: "Un film bergsonnien: Le Myst&re
Picassi " (Bazin 1959)'is an essay on cinema's relation to the flow 
of time, wh:.le "Charlie Chaplin" (Bazin 1967) illustrates Bergson's 
thesio that comedy results from a breakdown of our 'automatic' 
response to the world producing an intuition previously blocked by 
reason (Bergson 1911), Bazin, taking this further, caw photography 
as fulfilling Bergson's injunction to strip from thr w- Id "that 
spiritual dust and grime with which my eyes hove covered it" (Bazin 
1967 pl5).
It was the Bergsonian notion of the integral unity of a umvvrse in 
flux, that enabled Bazin to dispense with the notion of the film 
shot - the onalyt.ical notion that helps us see the world as cut up 
into fragments - with which he associated monatage. For 'great 
cinema1 Bazin proclaimed:
"there remains henceforth only the question of framing the 
fleeting crystallization of a reality of whose environing
presence one is ceaselessly aware" (Bazin 1967 p91)
- not montage but the “global" attitude of grasping reality 
intuitively.
Even more specifically in the realm of film criticism it was Esprit 
that had the greatest formative influence on Basin’s thought-
Roger Leenhardt's realistically orientated writings on cinema, 
especially “The Little Handbook of the Spectatorr,(1936). Leenhardt 
advocated the transr 'iption of reality as the purpose of 
photography and not Lisanatein's 'rhetorics'. For Leenhardt cinema 
attains its primary value not in becoming art, but in adapting 
itself to things aa they are, not through 'signifying' (that is 
rhetoric, conventional speech, conventional art and not for cirema) 
but 'rendering'. Unlike classical film aesthetics he says cinema 
is not a symbol system with a new set of signs - it is a partial 
view of something significant trying to appear through it,
Even more important was the influence of the founder/editor of 
Esprit and spokesman for the personalist movement, Emmanuel 
Mounier. He did not see personalism us a system but aa a 
perspective, a method, •• attitude situating man between 
systematization and solir Personalism claims more freedom for
man than Hegel, Marx or St. Thomas could offer, Not that Mounier 
uses arguments to oppose metaphysics - he opposes abstract 
systematic thinking. Metaphysios, he states, destroys thu mystery 
in nat'.re and replaces man'r freedom with a defined ren-. But 
opposition to systems is not the existentialist renc-ion of 
pessimism or solipsism. Mounier felt this response to .Vo world 
was equally presumptious. Personalism does not I'op tn a 
conclusion about the final nature of things, striving • x'aer to 
remain true to the ambiguities and confusing hopes .' 
Personalism is am 
"ethical programme by means of which beings can fu.:# 'valias 
their humanity in the context of an undefined and -v.curious
/
■t.
his world to build with such materials as he finds around him 
and to peer outward with such light as he can gather and 
dlract"(Andi,ew 1978 p35).
Bui.in adopted tms reaper.: e to the universe for his theory of the 
cinema. It is up to the filmmaker to use the camera to 'peer 
outward' and seek the 'light' of values. The true filmmaker 
attains power through 'style': an inner orientation facilitating
this outward search. Finding one's own orientation is arriving at 
ones own style which will give a stability to one's work. Thus 
style is not a given, it la an achieved self-awareness. This is 
the parallel to the calmness of the personal self achieved by 
retreating from the world. However in retreat the self/style can 
not develops and clarify 'for itself - it finds its existence only 
through immeralon in activity. Style is a mysterious power capable 
of revealing and transforming the substance of the world for Bazin 
and for Mounior.
"Man pressed down on nature to overcome nature, as the airplane 
presses on air In order to ascend"(Mounier 1970 p73).
Consider the 'reality axiom' in relation to the personaliet 
'mysterious otherness of external reality', i.ounier considered this 
otherness knovable to a person who has retreated into his inner 
distance, to return to focus on the physical world disposed to 
receive whutvver truths should be made known to him. The 
mysteriousness is not that of a naive realism which regards the 
world as awaiting clarification through the investigations of 
science as though it were a self-sufficient sphere we try in 
various ways to penetrate and use. Rather, Bazin is a pupil of the 
school of thought that regards mystery as a quality of the world 
itself, not something that can be overcome. For Mounier, like 
Sartre, Marcel and Merloau-Ponty, reality is not a situation 
available to experience, it exists only in experience - an emerging 
something in which the mind participates. Thus mystery is not the 
result of human limitations - it is an attribute of She real, a 
value attained when consciousness encounters the otherness we call 
the world. Filmmakers can tend to one of the ends of the spectrum:
aiding our encountens wit!’ the universe or an expressive devioe 
'speaking back1 to the universe. Bazin's derision for the latter 
fllmaakera Strived from the fact that they 'discovered' nothing, 
vffetiinj unly subjective opinions, arranging the world to fit their 
views. German Expressionists, for example, were not being honest 
in thflir use of nature as given - the film image. Cinema is 
obviously not the aame as objective reality but Bazin felt it was 
more than a mere opinion of reality: lying somewhere between
perspective and objectivity. In Bazin's geometrical vocabulary, 
cinema la a, 'asymptote' of reality - forever approaching but never 
becoming ret, :ty. For a filmmaker to deny the unique relation 
cinema has to reality is to turn his back on the possibility of 
discovery for the sake of his own views.
If this explains why Bozin didn't like certain films, It also 
explains why ho did like the iJeo-Realists, Fleherty and Renoir. 
His philosophical bias draws him towards the 'creative documentary' 
genre because these films are built on the central paradox: the
filmmaker must make reality look real (bo this extent at least 
Bazin subscribes to the rejection of realism aa the outcome of 
mechanical reyrvdurtion accepting that it is an effect that must bs 
consciously attained by the filmmaker) but he must also draw out 
the significance which la undiscovered in experience.
"There is no poiuC in rendering something realistically unless it 
la to maXe it moro meaningful in an abstract sense. In this 
paradox lies the progress of the movies. In this paradox foe 
lias chs genius of Ri.iclr, without doubt the greatest of all 
French directors"(Bazin 1.971 p85.).
Flaherty'b documentary work consists in, paradoxically, 
transforming appearance i- order to retain the significance of 
man'a life in his environment. The fact is that the mith of life 
goes beyond appearanco, hence the need for fabrication without a 
corresponding loss of honesty. Flaherty , for Instance, may vary 
well altar events but he never 'creates' a reaction - just presents 
it In relation to the action and the background. Renoir's
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can engage in all its mystery- As his biographer Andrew tells us: 
"Bazin loved Neo-Realist films not because of what they told him 
of cinema, but because of what they told him of reality"(Andrew
Bazin sought images of reality, not abstractions, in the cinema. 
Neo-Realism was entirely devoted to this cause. It goes beyond 
everyday perception not through any technical tricks but by 
concentration which allows details to stand out. (Bazin calls the 
Neo-Realist cameraman a 'filter'). The arrangement of the facts 
(dramaturgy) is natural and they are presented independently, What 
this means is that the filmmaker has selected certain facts and 
arranged then - herein lies the art of the film: an inner
disposition within the disposition of the facts of reality - but 
because the facts are independent they could as easily be
incorporated in a different arrangement. Two directors with the 
same facta would probably come up with different arrangements. 
Bazin suggests the relativist conclusion that there are many
equally valid descriptions of the phenomenal.
This is quite unlike the 1 facts' of fictional films. Fabricated 
in the first place, they are 'fashioned' carefully to lock into the 
film with no independant standing. Bazin's analogy is that of the 
rock as opposed to the brick:
"I will say this of the classical forms of art and of traditional 
realism, that they are built as houses are built, with bricks or 
cut atones. It is not a matter of calling into question either 
the utility of these houses or the beauty they may or may not 
have, or the perfect suitability of bricks to the building of 
houses. The reality of the brick lies less in its composition 
than it does in its form and strength. It would never enter your
head to define it as a piece of clay; its peculiar mineral
composition matters little. What does count is that it have the 
right dimensions. A brick is the basic unit of s house. That 
this is so is proclaimed by its appearance. One can apply the 
same argument to the stones of which a bridge is constructed.
They fit together perfectly to form an arch. But the big rocks 
that lie scattered in a ford are now and ever will be no more 
than mere rocks. Their reality as rocks is not affected when, 
leaping from one to another, I use them to cross the river. If 
the service which they have rendered is the same as that of the 
bridge, it is because I have brought my share of ingenuity to 
bear on their chance arrangement; I have ar’ded the notion which, 
though it alters neither their nature nor appearance, gives them 
a provisional meaning and utility. In the same way, the 
Neo-Realist film has a meaning, but it is a posteriori, to the 
extent that it permits our anarenssa to move from one fact to 
another, from one fragment of reality to the next, whereas in the 
Classical artistic composition the meaning is established a 
priori: the house is already there in the brick"(Bazin 1971
Thus for Bazin Neo-Realism and not "traditional Realism" more 
closely approximates everyday reality which does not consist of 
crossing readymade bridges but picking our way across stones to 
ford a river. Bazin's advocacy of Neo-Realism as opposed to 
Realism appears to be the film theoretical embodiment of Goodman's 
position that although it is familiarity that sets the realistic 
work apart, achievement of an even greater realism is attended by 
the notion of revelation. Quite apart from Bazin's belief in the 
unique tie ctrema in general enjoys with reality Bazin argued that 
the move from ti:s standard (Hollywood) mode of representation to a 
new (Neo-Realist) mode resulted in a new degree of realism. But is 
this the tension between familiarity and discovery as definitve of 
realism that is at the root of the term developed through the work 
of Goodman? A more detailed examination of Bazin's position would 
seem to indicate otherwise.
Bazin insists that it is to film's advantage that it approximates 
our everyday experience because it thereby shares in our 
appreciation of the beautiful forms of nature. This appreciation 
is built on a knowledge of the genesis of that form, the very
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knowledge that precludes our appreciation of artificial flowers.
Bazin's theory humbles the artlft before the film he ’helped bring 
about1, but it also singles out certain directors as great 
'explorers’ in 'bringing them about1. They are the directors whose 
films make available the greatest disclosures. For Bazin reality 
is the result of an encounter between an active apprehension and 
the fieli’ .’f phenomena within which it operates and these films are 
the inotrumente of reality. He talks of Citizen Kane(Welles 1940) 
and paisMRosaellir.i 1967) as recording Merleau-Ponty' s 
'ambiguities of experience', ee participating in a reality in which 
cinema was directly involved:
"although they use independant techniques, without the least 
possibility of a direct influence one on th- other, and 
possessed of tempe-aments that could hardly be less compatible, 
Rossellini and We:les have, to all intents and purposes, the 
same aesthetic objective, the same aesthetic concept of 
realism"(Bazin I97.i p39).
fiossollini's situation perhaps best illustrates Bazin's point about 
toe convergence if life, art, politics. Out of the ashes of the 
Second World War Rossellini, In exploring the crisis of his 
country, created a fi.'.m style which became a part of the culture it 
wished to document. It was not a film style born of moguls, studios
Bazin fslt he was championing the c,nematic equivalent of Esprit1s 
phenomenological stance: a wholeness of approach which does not
make a logical analysis of the situation, A cinema of description 
alone, personal perhaps but not an imaginative reshaping of the 
world. Rossellini:
"I try to interfere the minima,r, amount possible with the image, 
my interference is only to find the point of view and to say 
what is essential, no mors. That is why I insist really very 
strongly that I am not an artist .,. You can suggest and tell 
people what you have had the possibility to collect, observe,
and to see. You can give, but very smoothly, your point of view 
which is there as soon as you have made your choice. The choice 
comes from your personality, one thing attracts you more than 
another ... My purpose 1= never lo convey a message, never to 
persuade but to offer everyone an observation, even my 
observation. Why not?"<Schultz 1971 ppl5-16).
Bazin's work, no matter how fully one may sketch in its 
philosophical background, is chiefly a description of the realistic 
nature of the cinema. At worst it is a statement of axiomatic 
belief at the root of which lits a conviction about the signifying 
power of nature. The filmmaker is not some one who 'adds to' or 
'deforms' reality, but he:
"forces it to reveal its structural depth, to bring our the 
pre-existing relations which become constitutive of drama"(Bazin
It should be observed that Bazin's belief that there are 
pre-existing relations awaiting revelation provides a built in 
justification for the conclusion he will arrive at that a film's 
realism is at least ih part a revelation of 'meaning' through sheer 
re-presentation of spatial reality.
For Bazin the world is a world of possibilities - man can actuate
"The representation of space ... opens to a world of analogies, 
of metaphors or, to use Baudelaire's words in another no less 
poetic sense, of correspondences"(Bazin 1971 p90).
As we have see, film alone is the art form ontogenetically bound to 
the universe. "It is capable of re-presenting the spatrial order 
as completed in its own blocks of time", So film can isolate 
aspects of spatial reality in a frame, mark off events into blocks 
of time for f  arrangement as man encounters the universe, to aid 
his perception and understanding of what is limitless. It was hia 
belief that these aids did not make nature submit to human 
consciousness but or.ly gave us a chance to look at the 
'correspondences' in the universe "as long-lasting and as close-up
as you like"(Bazin 1967 p27). It is the great filmmaker who, by 
applying his gaze with sufficient intensity, reveals a 'flood of 
correspondences1 in the universe. Thus Rossellini is praised by
"There is nothing in his films that belongs to literature or to 
poetry, not even a trace of 'the beautiful' in the merely 
pleasing sense of the word. Rossellini directs facts ..- The 
world of Rossellini is a world of pure acts, unimportant in 
themselves but preparing the way (as if unbeknownst to God 
himself! for the sudden daezltris revelation of their 
meaning"(Bezin 1971 plOO).
Sirilarily the films of Renoir end Welles, although dramatic 
fictional situations on an artificial stage, carefully maintain the 
field of interdeprtndan-: elements resulting in realism. Meaning 
arises as relationship!! disclose themselves in this field. The 
directors Job is ro originate and then observe the development of 
these relationships. He doesn't create meaning, his job is 
"framing the flouting crystallization of a reality of whose 
“r.vironing presence ofie is ceaselessly aware"(Bazin 1957 p91).
It is Citizen Kana(Welles 1940) above all others that Bazin felt 
forced him to locate a metaphysics within a style of photography 
and narrative. This uunviotion came from the overt correspondence 
between film style and ..arger concerns when Bazin viewed the film. 
It had been rejected by the film world in Paris which followed 
Sartre's line that it was 'pretentious' and 'fatalistic1. Analyzing 
the flit's tenses, Sartre 'found' that the narrative technique of 
Citizen Kano was appropriate to literature alone. Sartre saw the 
role of cinema as an art of the present tense appropriate to a 
revolutionary consciousness and not a fatalistic gaze into the 
past. Against the ensuing flood of condemnations, Basin defended a 
story and pictorial representation which he found corresponded so 
closely to his own way of imagining reality.
Bazin believed that the intense experience of Citizen Kans is a
of attention, to perceive the breaks imposed by the 
the continuous development of the represented event,
of conventions, called invisible montage, loads
creating what is psychologically real by matching
I
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oonplsta aystam '■f abstraction (huJ) been fraudulently 
introduced... subordinating the wholeness of reality to the sense 
of the .ition" (Bazin 1950 p57). 
weilue gives us a world wnicn is Infinitely more Interesting than 
the drama itself by making " Che action unroll continuously in its 
own block of time" (Andrew 1976 pl27).
"In reality when I am involved In an action, my attention, 
directed by my plan, proceeds likewise to a kind of virtual shot 
breakdown In which the objec1- effectively loses for me some of 
its aspects, to become Instead a sign or a tool; but the action 
remains always in the act of becoiwnlnn and the object is 
constantly free to recall for me its objactlveness and 
consequently to modify ny planned action. For my part, I am at 
every moment free to 10 longer will this action and to be 
'roksne.l by reality which ceases then to appear to me as just a 
box of tools" (Bazin 1950 p58)
Thus reality is, at least in part, a free Interplay between man and 
the jbjtcts he perceives. Conventional editing imitates our habit 
or -irfienizini; these forcettlons by making them conform to a 1 plot1.
For Bazin thia destroys our freedom to organise our field of 
purcuptlon and destrcys tie autonomy of the objects (and thus the 
possibility of other 'plots').
"Classical editing totally suppresses this kind of reciprocal 
freedom between us and the object. It substitutes for a free 
organization a forced shot breakdown where the logic of each shot 
ia controlled by the reporting of the action. This utterly 
anaesthetizes our freedom" (Bozin 1950 p5B).
Welles gave us more than a new style, he changed our conception of 
the filmed event and the spectator of that filmed event. The key 
word was 'participation'. The results extend beyond cinema. 
Citizen Kane is a new conception of the universe and man's place in 
jtl Traditional editing:
"....tends to exclude in particular the ambiguity imminent in 
reality. It 'subjectivisee1 the event in the extreme, since each
/
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moment or p.Tticle then Becomes the forgone conclusion of the
director. This does not only imply o dramatic choice, emotional
or moral, but again and more profoundly, a tailing of a position 
on reality insofar as it is such" (Bazin 1947 pp943-9).
Welles does not allow the audience the comfort of 'focused' 
conceptions of life, drama, metaphysics,
"Depth of field ... forces the spectator to make use of the
freedom of his attention and demands, at the same time, that he
feels the ambivalence of reality" (Bazin 1950 p56~9).
Citizen Kane then is a natural support for Bazin's philosophy - the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, Sartre and Esprit. Welles
"A poet must seek out and cultivate his contradictions... I 
demand that men should have the right to keep and to encourage 
his contradictions"(Clay 1973 p66).
Not for Bazin the role of cinema as simplifier of the world; rather 
Welles' -personaltst1 task of wrenching meaning ar.d identity from 
the ambiguity of experience. The structures of Welles' films are 
forever questioned by the uncertainty of the universe beyond.
1 asked the question 1 la this the tension between familiarity and 
discovery that is at the root of realism according to Goodman's 
definition of that tera?' . To which the answer 'no' must now be 
given. The understanding of the notion of familiarity that Bazin 
talks of as basic to Neo-Realist filmmaking is not the familiarity 
of a standard mode of representation that Goodman fait 
differentiated the realist work of art. It is rather the 
familiarity of 'conventionless rendering1; 'images of reality',
1 the facts of reality' 'brought about1 by the filmmaker who offers 
a 'long-lasting closo-up' of 'pure acts'. This is not the 
familiarity of an established system of conventions such as Goodman 
argues allows information to issue with ease. This Is what Bazin 
would understand as 'traditional Realism'; he would read Goodman's 
claims as conventionalist. On this understanding he would reject
Goodman because the familiarity o ventional editing is not what 
Dazln wants from a realist work, it..'' sible montage is a deception 
which may be psychologically satis '-ing but is not revelatory of 
'reancy1 . in short, Bazin is arguing against realism as an effect 
- he would argue that the familiarity suggested by Goodman belongs 
to the realm of the conventional whereas his notion of familiarity 
is somehow connected to a realism of a deeper sort.
But as much as Bazin may want to go beyond a psychology conducive 
to realism in film to establish a special tie between cinema and 
reality on the basis of the meaning it can reveal through sheer 
re-presentation 01 spatial reality, the facts argue against his 
correlation of realism with revelation divorced from a standard 
mode of representation that :s as conventional as any other mode of 
representation. Realism has to be created as an effect by the 
filmmaker working within the confines of the standard mode of 
representation. In attempting to generate the realistic effect the 
filmmaker is confronted by t\ number of choices which will either 
enhance or detract from the realism of the film. Bazin's attempt 
to go beyond a 'psychology of realism in film' to a realism 
deriving from a sheer re-presentation of spatial reality ignores 
both the filmmaker and the v..ewer in assuring the mechanical nature 
of photography results in an Inevitable, innocent reflection of 
reality. ' There is nothing inevitable or innocent about a 
filmmaker's choices in creating a realistic effect as those choices 
depend on the viewer's experience of the world which is neither 
innocent nor objective. Rather our experience of the world is 
encoded (as the chapter on semiology will detail)-, we modify and 
reconstruct the world in order that we may experience it. So too 
the realist filmmaker must, encode reality: his films can not
simply reflect reality, they must appeal to the viewer by reminding 
him/her of the codes. As Roland Barthes (1974) argued for 
literature, film is a 'structure' deriving from an Interplay of 
codes, The realist filmmaker has a story to tell - a hermeneutic 
code - and a set of actions to convey - a proairetio code - which 
he relates to our experience of the world outside by means of
reference to accepted knowledge - the cultural code - and "flickers 
of meaning" - the coda of semes. This is how the realist filmmaker 
generates the realistic effect - by encoding reality in a 
particular form and relationship to align the film with the 
viewer's experience of reality. The product of an encoding which
because of its form and the relationship between the codes
corresponds to the viewer's experience of reality is a familiarity 
such that the viewer foes not even notice his reading, choosing eru 
interpreting of the images. Thus contra Bazin it is familiarity 
that differentiates the realistic work and so invisible montage may
well oe the choice of the filmmaker striving for realign. That
Bazin's notion of realism can not encompass the familiar in this 
sense and the discovery that attends the departure from the 
standard mode of representation is the shortcoming of a tneorist 
who refuses to acknowledge that realism is an effect reliant on the 
artist's appreciation of the appropriate choice between familiarity 
and discovery. There are no truths to be discovered, no 
p.---existing relations awaiting revelation, only the viewer's 
Beliefs concerning 'truth' and so Bazin's definition of realism in 
terms of his understanding of the Neo-Realist task can not escape 
the limits of tihat is psychologically realistic for the viewer. In 
the end that is all that is important and not some claim to n 
realism that goes beyond film and forces the viewer into a 
personalist enquiry.
But if Hazin is wrong about realism not involving convention, he is 
right about the ease with which the realistic effect is achieved in 
film even if this can not be said to constitute a unique tie to 
reality. The following chapter on semiology will explain, the 
filmmaker mat set up the conditions of the 'illusion' of realism 
but equally it will show how film fosters that illusion and has 
&raat difficulty in reproducing something In a form different to 
experienced reality and thus in a form conducive to thought. These 
are two sides of the same coin and will be the subject of chapter
5. REALISM AMD SEMIOLOGY 
CHRISTIAN METZ
The previous chapter approached film with a specific aesthetic - 
Bazin’s realist aesthetic - based on particular beliefs about the 
ontology of the photographic linage and influenced by particular 
philosophical standpoints concerning the ambiguous realities of 
nature. If 'realism' as set out by Bazin is not a prescriptive 
aesthetic, oa a theory of film it is both normative and evaluative. 
This chapter will attempt to approach film with a specific set of 
tools which will reveal the me<hanisms behind the achievement of 
contrastive realism, as opposed to non-realism, as an effect without 
attaching any specific values to those mechanisms. This will be 
achieved by looking at how cinema communicates through studying its 
minimal units of signification - signs - and the application of a 
linguistic model. Christian Metz s Film language(1974a) and Language 
and Cinema(197db) rank among the more important attempts at setting 
out a semiology of the cinema.
In effect, to deal with the question of realism it will be necessary 
to incorporate both of Gilbert Cohen-Seat’s possibilities for the 
semiotlc study of film (Metz 1974a p90):
- the cinematic: the presentation of codes, signification in film,
films in effect cut off from their genesis or results/effects and
- the filmic: the relationship of film to the world outside of film, 
what the signifying codes embody psychologically, sociologically, 
culturally and aesthetically.
Metz himself has very little to tuy explicitly about ’realism1 apart 
from the first chapter of film Lannuaee entitled "On the Impression of 
Reality in the Cinema" but even this forma part of a section devoted 
to "Phenomenological Approaches to Film". But implicitly film 
semiotics must confront realism not least because realistic cinema
(Lodge 1977 p84).
smiology (fr
Greek semeton 'sign').
general science of semiology;
the characters of all signs used by a ‘scientific1 intelligence, 
that is to say by an intelligence capable of learning by 
experience" (Peirce 1936 227).
Approaching non-lii^uistic sign systems as languages by employing a 
linguistic model works to the advantage of any investigation as it 
ensures the treatment of what may otherwise appear tc be 1 natural 
signs', having intrinsic meaning and therefore not requiring 
explanation, as signs whose meanings are the product of culture and 
convention (in short like the apparently arbitrary linguistic signs'). 
The better understanding of film as a sign system that semiology 
offers is achieved only through a formal study of signs and a precise 
application of the linguistic model. While the latter task will be 
undertaken through the work of Christian Metz, the account of signs 
that is of immediate concern here requires an investigation of the 
sophisticated classification proposed by Peirce in his "Speculative 
Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meaning of signs" 
(Peirce 1936 1.191).
Charles Saunders Peirce '
In turning to Peirce, the aspect of his account that is of some import 
for the concerns of this dissertation is his distinction between three 
different kinds of signs.
"There may be a mere relation of reason between the sign and the 
thing Signified; in that case the sign is an icon. Or there may be 
a direct phyaica. ..•onnection; in that case the sign is an index. 
Or there may be a relation which consists in the fact that the mind 
associates the sign with its object; in that case the sign is a 
name [or symbol]"(Peirce 1936 1.372).
An icon is something that, is related to its object by similarity 
whether of not the object exists.
"An icon is a representamen of what it represents and for the mind 
that interprets it as such, by virtue of its benng an immediate 
image, that is to say by virtue of characters which belong to it in

Xrepresentamen by virtue of a character which it co Id not have if 
its object did not exist, but which it will continue to have just 
the same whether it be interpreted as a representamen or 
not'MPelrce 1936 5.73).
As with icons the sign vehicle and its relation to its object exist 
independently of its ever being actually used as a sign.
Peirce describes the function of indexical meaning as something which 
"forces the attention to the particular object intended without 
describing it"(Peirce 1936 1.369).
The pointing finger is an index: it has a spatial relation to its
object and directs attention. As to the purity of indices, consider 
cause-effect relationships.
"Insofar as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has 
some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect of 
these that It refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a 
sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not a 
mere resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which make 
it a sign, but it in the actual modification of it by the 
ObJecf'iPeirce 1936 2.246).
If we turn to language, we are concerned with degenerate indices - not 
real connections which assure us of the reality of the object as in 
the case of genuine indices discussed above.
"Every subject partakes of the nature of an index, in that its 
function is the characteristic function of an index, that of 
forcing the attention upon its object. Yet the subject of a 
symbolic proposition cannot strictly be an index"(Peirce 1936
It is the manner in which a grammatical subject functions, or for that 
matter pronouns or proper names that allows Peirce to call them 
Indices. That is, not in the strict sense but simply because of their 
denotative function. A word can not be an index but it can
"call upon the hearer to use his powers of observation, and so 
establish a real connection between his mind and the object"(Peirce 
1936 2.287).
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In a similar vein, quantifiers, in so far as they give directions for 
selecting the subject of the proposition, are Indexical as are
directions which bring the interpreter into connection with the 
intended object.
"A symbol is a law, or regularity of the indefinite future"(Peirce 
1936 2.293).
The symbol is related to its object by virtue of a habit of 
associat
"... the [symbol] is the general name or description which signifies 
its object by means of an association of ideas or habitual
connection between the name and the character aignified"(Peirce 
1936 1.369).
For this reason there can be no actual - potential distinction for 
symbols: the sign vehicle is related to the. object by a mind. This
is why Peirce calls symbols genuine signs - the foundation for the
sign relationship comes from the fact that the relation is triadic.
Note that the symbol is not the some as the token. One may erase a 
word (token) from a page but that does not erase the symbol (type). 
The function of the symbol is to bring generality to the sign's 
process:
"Such signs are always abstract and general, because habits are 
general rules to which the organism has become subjectedM(Peirce 
1936 3.360).
The manner in which the symbol carries this out is to influence the 
images, concepts and actions of the interpreter.
"The being of a symbol consists in the real fact that something 
surely will be experienced if certain conditions be satisfied. 
Namely, it will influence the thought and conduct of its 
interpreter"(Peirce 1936 d,447).
The interpreter sees a token of the symbol and associates a mental 
icon with the objects denoted by the symblo in that context. This 
associative habit is the symbol.
"any ordinary word as 'give1, 'bird', 'marriage' is an example of a 
symbol. IS is applicable to whatever may be found to realize the
Xidea connected with the word: it does not, in itself, identify
those things. It does not show us a bird, not enact before our 
eyes a giving in marriage, but supposes that we are able to imagine 
those things, and have associated the word with them"(Peirce
For the symbol the qualitative possibility is the icon and the 
existent is the token. The symbol consists in the fact that the 
quality will be associated with the existent. It is this habit of 
association and not the icon or token which embodies generality.
Fitzgerald explains Peirce's division of signs as follows:
"If we are able to reason about the objects in the world, we must be 
able to recognize similarities between one object and another. 
Such a process requires the use of icons. But an icon, which of 
itself is a potential sign, requires that there be an interpreter, 
who is able to take note of the features of similarity. It is only 
by reason of this latter process that generality enters the sign 
process. But when generality enters, we have thirdness of law, so 
we are concerned with symbols. However, the icon and the symbols 
of themselves are not sufficient, since neither of them indicates 
the subject of discourse. Indices are needed to bring our 
attention to the objects to which the symbol and its accompanying 
icon apply"(Fitzgerald 1966 p66).
Simply to extract the distinction between icon, index and symbol from 
the broader concerns of Peirce's theory of the nature and meaning of 
signs is to simplify his work to the point of misrepresentation. 
However as Peirce himself did not evince any particular concern with 
aesthetics it has proved necessary for commentators to isolate that 
area of his philosophy which is appropriate to their concerns. It is 
particular!ly the upshot of Peirce's distinction between the three 
kinds of signs which has been seen to he important in the field of 
aesthetics, and specifically film.
Peter Wollen has been a central figure in exploiting Peirce's triadic
distinction for the analysis of film. Wollen arrived at his 
conviction about the importance of Peirce's distinction, as opposed to 
the more generally adopted Suassurian account of signs for 
semiolo&ical film analysis, via the work of Roman Jakobeon who:
"pointed out that whereas Saussure held that signs that are wholly 
arbitrary realise better than the others the ideal of the 
semiological process, Peirce believed that in the moat perfect of 
signa the iconic, the mdexlcol and the symbolic would be 
amalgamated as nearly as possible in equal proportions" {Wollen 
1982 pl42),
Wollen in Signs and Meanlne in the Cinema (1962) (one of the major 
English language texts on semiology and film) suggests that the 
cinematographic image is such an amalgam with few rivals in the world 
of communication, In a film one is confronted with all three modes of 
signifying alternately. Consider the remartable ant-covered hand from 
Dali and Bunuel's Un Chion Andglou (1928).
"Iconic, tndexical and symbolic values are all present: the image
is striking for its own sakel it is a measure of the infestation of 
the soul of the owner of the hand: it xs certainly symbolic of a 
more general mal.aiso', as well. It is treConymic, because the ants 
are an 'associated detail1! it is also synecdochio, because the 
hand is a pwt that stands for the whol'i. Finally, the source of 
the image seems be a trope: n verbal pun on the French Idiom
'avoir des fourmis oans les nains', 'to have ants in the hand', an 
expression equivalent to the English 'ins hand is asleep1 . By 
illustrating the turn of phrase literally, Dali and Bunuel extended 
the trope so that a common experience is turned into a striking 
sign of decay"(Monaco 1961 pl41).
Wollen's argument is that
"In fact the aesthatic richness of the cinema springs from the fact 
that it comprises all three dimensions of the sign; indexical, 
iconic and symbolic. The great weakness of almost all those who 
have written abou-: the cinema is that they have taken one of these 
dimensions, made ..t the ground of their aesthetic, the ’essential'
dimension of the cinematic sign, end discarded the rest. This is 
to impoverish the cinema. Moreover, none of these dimensions can 
be discounted: they are co-present. The great merit of Peirce's
analysis of signs is that he did not see the different aspects as 
mutually exclusive. Unlike Saussure he did not show any particular 
prejudice in favour of ons or the other. Indeed, he wanted a logic 
and a rhetoric which would be based on all three ospeots. It is 
only by considering the interaction of the three different 
dimensions of the cinema that one can understand its aesthetic 
effect" (Wollen 1382 pill).
There oan Be no precise distinction between signs in a film, merely a 
discussion of the prevalence of one mode of signification at the level 
of units, signs, sequences or the whole work. Along these lines Lee 
Russell (IS ) posits the predominance of one dimension over the 
others throughout film history. Thus the films of Von Sternberg, 
Ophuls, Resnais, Antonioni, Rosi and Petri belong to the iconic 
dimension along with various 'underground' worKs by Markopoulos, 
Warhol, Patella, Schifano and Rosbosch. The films that Belong to the 
indextcal dimension nould be those of Flaherty, Murnau, Von Stroheim, 
Renoir, Welles, Wyler, Rosselini and the Italian Neo-Realists. The 
symbolic dimension is most obvious in the films of Eisenatein, 
Resnais, Pas lini and some Godard.
The exact categorization of films on this basis is not of any direct 
concern here, however it will be of Interest to take one or more 
fllm(s) from each of Russell's groupings and attempt to understand the 
perceived realism of the workts) in terms of the predominait 
dimension.
Joseph Von Sternberg belongs to the iconic dimension, At the same 
time his films stand in opposition to Realist cinema. Everything may 
be taken from socio-geographic reality - a real boat is filmed on a 
real beach, and real walls under a real sky in The Salvation 
Hunbers(1925) - but it is all material for the elaboration of a purely 
filmic milieu. Von Sternberg sets out to destroy the existential bond
between tho natural world and the filmic image. He stressed the 
pictorial character of the cinema - he saw himself aa the auteur of a 
film equivalent to the auteur of a poem despite the mechanical nature 
of his medium, Thus he was at pains to set up a filmic discourse at a 
distnce from the wurld -
"a world governed by laws other than those of Imitation and 
representation, and certainly other than those of everyday 
causality" (vlaude Oilier in Roud 1980 p950),
As tfollen puts it:
"It was the iconic aspect of the sign which Von Sternberg stressed, 
detached from the indexical In order to conjure up a world, 
comprehensible by virtue of resemblances t> the natural world, yet 
other than it, a kind of dream world, a leterocoam" (Wollen 1982
What Von Sternberg exhibics is that a scvesslng of the iconic aspect 
of the sign Is compatible with anti-Realist filmmaking. In the very 
first chapter, Goodman began his account of rnalism with the statement 
that resemblance is neither a sufficient; nor necessary condition for 
representation and therefore resemblance can not be basic to realism. 
Rather Goodman pointed' out It is the mode of representation that 
generates resemblance. In tho case of thti cinematic image tho 
mechanical naturu of the recording camera inv.tes the iconic dimension 
of the sign. However, and here is a vindication of Goodman's position 
on resemblance, if the indexicai aspect is suppressed no amount of 
stress laid on the iconic aspect will generate! realism, The films of 
Von Sternberg are the fulfillment of his anti-Realist aesthetic: his
sets may resemble the natural world with meticulous attention paid to 
every detail but they are not realistic in effect. They are strictly 
stereotyped worlds - as close as possible to the commonally admitted 
givens, corresponding exactly to what Is expected. But by virtue of 
the misa an scSne, the lighting, the dslivery of lines, characters 
relations to objects and gestures, the result is a wholly artificial 
apace organized by the director. The director of films like 
Morocco(1930) and The Devil Is a Woman(1935) is actually subverting 
the storootypoa by framing, elongation, distortion - undermining the
.i
st r-otype and the system of representation that underlies it. In its 
place is a non-realistic 'universe apart1; aesthetic and abstract.
In fact Von Sternberg provides further vindication of Goodman's 
dismissal of accounts of realism which implicitly argue from the 
'Iconiclty premise’, The very nature of the cinematic image as the 
product of a mechanical recording device suggests it is a claimant of 
the title 'closest possible copy of an object’ but a film like The 
Saea of Anattahan (Von Sternberg 1953) indicates that this is no 
guarantee of realism. Further, film as the 'closest possible copy of 
an object1 offers perhaps the highest probability of confusion between 
representation and rrpresentamen and yet a Von Sternberg film like The 
Blue Angel (1930) shows that decpetion haa no direct link to realism.
The salient insight to be gained from the films of directors like Von 
Sternberg working in the iconic dimension is that despite the 
familiarity of what Is presented because of the use of a standard mode 
of representation the resemblance that is generated thereby is no 
guarantee of realism. The cinematic sign is an amalgamation of the 
iconic, the indexical and the symbolic. The detachment of the iconic 
aspect from the indexical generates a work of art that offers only a 
surface resemblance to 'the natural ’world1 but not thereby a 
familiarity that allows 'Information to issue with ease' to the 
spectator.
Familiarity of the sort important to realism is far more the preserve 
of the filmmakers who belong to the indexical dimension. A glance 
through the list reveals that these are e filmmakers around whom 
Batin developed his Baalist aesthetic. It will be recalled that this 
was an aesthetic which shunned 'mere resemblance' in favour of an 
existential bond between fact and image, between world and film. Of 
the mechanical reproduction of reality he wrote;
"The photograph proceeds by means of the lens to the taking of a 
veritable luminous impression of light - to a mold, As such it 
caries with it more than mere resemblance, namely a kind of 
iden:ity ..." (Bazin 1967 p96)
"The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from 
the conditions of time and space, by virtue of the very process of 
its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the 
lupoi'uuckion; in is The model" (Bazin 1967 pl4).
More specifically it was the filmmakers of the Realist tradition who 
used deep focus to maintain the spacial unity of scenes and thus 
presenting the event in its physical entirety and it was the 
Neo-Realists who made films from 'the fragments of raw reality1 - 
shooting on location, without a script, using amateur actors - 
allowing the world to reveal itself rather than imposing an 
interpretation on it.
Hone of this serves to argue that a director in the Realist tradition 
lias to be a documentsrist. When ,nio steals, a bicycle in Bicyle 
Thieves (De Sica 1948) it is a scene 'set up1 for the earners, not some 
unwittifg thief trapped by a hidden camera, yet this is a Neo-Realist 
work. But does this mean we have than to argue that the actual 
existence of subject of a film, having been found rather than made, is 
an explanation for a films realism: fcnVonio exists, so does toe
bicycle and the scene unfolded in exactly the nay reproduced by the 
camera Bazin argues. He suggests that it is our awareness of thie, 
tlid psychological power which this attaches to the cin.cma.ttc image, i.s 
the root of the film's realism. But equally traes a-irl sets in The 
Sue* of Anatnhan exist - no amount of painting with aluminium paint 
could alter that fact. The viewer's awareness of the aluminium 
painted treas' ontological status does not rake ':he film realistic for 
the viewer. Sorting into realistic and unrealistic does not precede 
on the basis of ontological categorization. It was Goodman's 
arguement that sny sorting we do is on the basis of kinds of *or,:s 
without reference to the ontological status of that which they denote. 
The kind of work that is realistic is a real-object-work. Bicycle 
Thieves is realistic not b auee Antonio is a real person but because 
it is a real-person-work and The Saga of Anatahan is unrealistic not 
because silver trees are unreal entities but because it is an 
unreal-object-work.

AIf the iconic and especially the indexical aspects of the cinematic 
sign seem to have the capacity for an explanation of the realism of 
the image, that is because they are the most powerful aspects of the 
cinematic sign. The third aspect - the symbolic - is secondary and 
limited. Despite myriad theories of film which seek to explain the 
cinema by analogy with an actual language as opposed to utilizing a 
linguistic model, apart from the verbal sounds of speech and the 
graphic form of credits, the cinema is primarily indexical and iconic. 
In the visual image, the musical soundtrack and the sound effects the 
symbolic dimension is submerged.
The iconic dimension of the cinematic image is in part separable from 
the symbolic dimension. It has been argued in this paper that 
resemblance is a product of representational practices and further 
that the mode of representation which is most realistic is established 
by convention. In other words it is the habit of association (the 
symbolic) that is the underpinning for the iconic dimension of realist 
cinema. The symbolic dimension in this way serv;s to underpin the 
indexical dimension also, for the iconic dimension itself underpins 
the viewer's awareness erf indexicality that results in the revelations 
of a new degree of realism. The model of reality is the filmmaker's 
construction, its iconicity an explicit creatim cl the director, the 
cinematographer, the production designer ... . The perceived
indexicality which engenders the psychology of realism in the viewer 
springs in part from the iconicity of the reprenentatton which is 
itself a conventionally established associative habit of the spectator 
used by the filmmaker to generate realism and et the same time making 
that reality meaningful in an abstract sense. The symbolic dimension 
of the signs of the cinema and their ordering open up a whole domain 
of meaning within the model of reality created by the filmmmaker. 
This in itself is not a guarantee of a film's realism as is evinced by 
the fact that the films which explore this symbolic dimension most 
explicitly number among the least realistic creations of the cinema, 
L'AnnSe Derni&re a Marienbad (Resnais 1961) being an obvious example. 
But the symbolic can and does work towards the revelation that is part
Aof realism: it gives The viewer a new frame of reference through its
particular description of the phenomenal, a revelation that goes 
through to reality itself. This is the realism of which Bazin wrote 
when he argued the case for Citizen Kane(VSelles 1940) which did not 
merely give
''the illusion of being at real events unravelling before us in an 
everyday reality" (Bazin 1950 p5L)
"forces the spectator to make use of the freedom of his attention 
and demands, at the same time, that he feels the ambivalence of 
reality" (Bazin 1950 p56-9),
But the symbolic dimension remains equally the preserve of Antonioni 
and his grey-painted fruit on a street barrow, red cabin on the 
waterfront and bedroom suffused with pink in Red Desert (1964), 
Resnais and his geometrical gardens and endlesa corridors in L'Annge 
Derni&re a Marlenbad (1961) and Rossellini and his children and babies 
(born and unborn) in Home Open City (1945), each one of these a 
director whose work reflects a predominance of a different mode of 
signification.
Thus armed with a Peircean account of signs ana its extrapolation into 
the realm of film, one must turn to de Saussure to provide a
linguistic model to apply to sign systems and more specifically to 
Christian Metz for an understanding of film as a sign system. By 
approaching film in this way the mechanisms behind the achievement of 
realism as an effect will be repealed.
Having suggested how Lee Russell's theory (1974) that one dimension of 
the sign may predominate over the others in different filmmaker's 
works may be related to the perceived realism of those works it 
remains to be said that such an exercise is based on the assumption
that we can isolate signs in the cinema as one can in a language.
But, as will become apparent from the investigation of Metz's
semiology of film, film cannot be equated with natural language. 
Signs approximate words but the cinema h.is no words, only sentences. 
The shot in a film, as will be pointed out by Metz, is not the
equivalent of the word but rather of the sentence. Cinema, in short, 
is all syntax and syntax can not be iconic or indexioal. It is 
therefore unclear what it could mean to relate realism to the 
predominance of a dimension of the sign in a film.
What can be argued is that the Peircean analysis of the sign is meant 
to apply 'metaphorically' to the cinema. It is a classification 
picked up by commentators to suggest that items other than signs may 
produce the effect of iconicity, indexicality or symbolioity end that 
these effects may relate to the realism of the work. This is to argue 
that while syntax can not be iconic or indexioal or symbolic it can 
produce these as effects and so film can accrue the realism that it is 
-•gued is related to the predominance of one or other of these 
dimensions in the work. This in part, accounts for the ease with which 
film can attain the realist effect but it would be going too far to 
posit a unique tie between film and reality.
It is to Meta we must now turn for a specitlc application of the 
linguistic model to film to reveal the 'mechanisms behind the 
achievement of realism as an effect.
Meta embarks on his semiological study by drawing the distinction that 
needs to be made fnr an application of the linguistic model to film: 
that film is a language and n- a language system. The distinction is 
derived from de Sauseure's A Course in General Ltngulstlcs(19S9):
- language (in general) or langaee is the universal capacity for 
utterance or discourse;
- a language system or langue is a particular, organized, articulated 
system of communication and
- speech or parole is an individual realisation of the potential 
Inherent in a language system - a particular act or instance of that 
system.
Thus film for Metz is not a language system (langue), like English, it 
is a language Uangage) which includes various language systems, Metz
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three mein raaaons vhy film is not a language system;
(1) The main reason it is not a language system is that it lacks
double articulation: there are no phonemes combining into
moi’phemes/monemee, minimal units of sound besoming minimal units 
of meaning, (second articulation to first articulation). This 
ability of language to function at the two levels of sound and 
meaning (its power of double articulation) is denied to cinema 
where cinematic signifiers are more closely tied to their
signifies. Cinema simply presents us with images which are
realistic representations and sounds that are accurate
reproductions. The signifiers can not be broken up without
breaking up the signifieds also. In other words there is no way 
of breaking up the image of a nan talking sc that it can function
with other images to produce different senses as the word 'talk'
can be changed to 'talking', 'talked' or 'talkative'.
(2) The image can not be construed as tha cinematic equivalent of the
word (as held by Kuleshov and Pudovkin). A shot in a film gives 
more information than a word, more than a minimal unit of meaning.
Metz's famous dictum is that a shot of a tiger says: "Here is a
tiger", not just "Tiger". No dictionary of the cinema is
possible.
(3) The relation between image and meaning derived is motivated, de 
Saussure asserts that the relation between the linguistic
signifier (the acoustical image) and the signified (the 'meaning' 
of Lhat image) is unmotivated or arbitrary. The connection
between the two is conventionally established and the resultant 
sign is part of the language system, By contrast the visual image
such as the one presented to us in film actually resembles the
referent. There is a motivated relationship between signifier and 
signified:
"the signifier is coextensive with the whole of the significate 
[signified], the spectacle its awn signification"(Metz 1974a
For Metz cinema ■% thus a Language;
(1) It is not a language system comprised of signs for
intercommunication, it is one way communication. No response to 
the signs presented on the screen has any impact on the objective, 
formal configuration of the image. As we cannot 'converse' with 
images the ulm's system of communication is always used 
poetically. What this means is that cinema, unlike verbal 
language, lacks a 'basic' or non-poetis usage1 - a long-standing 
system which is adopted and then perhaps 'deformed' by poutic and 
artistic sensibilities so that the discourse can "speak a new 
meaning”.
(2) It does not even have a grammar am far as Metz is concerned. What 
would an ungrammatical fils construction be1? We miiy not like or 
find a particular choxc= of image or a particular combination of 
images familiar but does that mean it is ungrammatical and 
nonsensical? The film has a natural expressivity - the filmmaker 
'directs' these expressions to signify his own meaning not 
according to fixed rules.
(3) It does not have the double articulation which ocnatitutes the 
arbitrary signs of a language system;
"the image is first snd always an image. In its perceptual 
literalness It ■ reproduces the signified spectacle whose 
e.gnifier it ia; and thus it becomes what it shousM(Metz 1974a
"from Che very first an image is not The indication of something 
other than itself bu» the pseudopresenoe of the thing it 
contains"{Metz IS^da p76).
Metz here aligns himself explicitly with Bazin by asserting that 
the photograph is the only kind of image 
"that can give ub the absolute certainty that graphic outlines 
are faithfully respected (because their representation is 
obtained by a process of mechanical duplication) and where, in 
soma way, the actual object has come to print itself on the 
virgin film" (Metz 1974a pl4),
It was Bazin's theory that it is this that "forces" the viewer 
"to eccapt tha existence of the object reproduced, actually 
re-presented, set before us, chat is to say, in time and space"
(Bazin 1957 p!4)
The notion of language only really domes into its own when dealing 
vatn filmed narratives according to Metz:
"'cinematographic language1 is first of ell the literalness of a 
plot" (Metz 1974e p99).
The reality conveyed to us through images is the reality of a work of 
art presenting us with a narrative which external reality does not 
g:.ve us. Thus cinema is a language
"to the extent that it orders signifying elements within ordered 
arrangements different from those of spoken idioms - and to the 
extent that these elements are not trsced on the perceptual 
configurations of realty itself (which does not tell stories). 
Filmic manipulation transforms what might have been a mere visual 
transfer of reality Into discourse" (Metz 1974 plOB).
Discourse is the filmmaker's use of the combinative aspect of speech 
si. that the code of language can be made to express his personal 
thought. Metz explains that this discourse depends on five cinematic
"the visual image, the musical sound, the verbal sounds of speech, 
sound effects, end the graphic form of credits" (Metz 1974b pl6).
Metz confronts the codes of the filmic system in his semiotics by 
dealing with 'signifluaUon' by a 'code' in a 'text'. Signification 
exists in the sign values, the messages, vie perceive. It ie In fact 
the process of asserting such messages by means of a system of signs. 
These messages are coded in 'tsxts'.
Stanley Kubrick
The 'texta' that will be confronted by Meta's semiotics in this 
dissertation will be the films of Stanley Kubrick. This choice stems 
from the fact that Kubrick’s ’filmed narratives' fall roughly into the 
category of 1 commercial cinema1 and so evince the 'realistic' cinema 
norm. They therefore provide ample scope for the investigation of the 
achievement of the realistic effect by the director, a task which is
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made simpler by tile fact that Kubrick is one of cinema's most exacting 
'technical artists' drawing on a vast array of cinematic devices to 
generate the required effect. Although this effect may not always be 
one of realism, it will nevertheless become apparent from the body of 
his work with what consumete ease cinema is capable of producing 
realism and how the same can not be said for non-realism. Kubrick's 
range of subject matter emphasises this point, ranging as it does from 
the science fiction of 2001 A Space 0dysgey(196S) and A Clockwork 
0range(137l) to the costume drama of Barr: Lyndon(1975) the
supernatural/horror in The Shlnlng(lgao) and the Vietnam War in Full 
Metal Jacket(1987) ■ Reference will also be made to the nuclear 
apocalypse black comedy Or Strsngelovedosa) and his earlier works 
Lollta(1962). Paths of Glory(1957), The Klllinall9S6)■ Killer's 
Klss(1955)■ Fear and Deslre(1353) and tho disowned. Sparte.cus(lS59).
The discussion of realism in terms of Kubrick's body of work dismisses 
any preconceptions about realism's dependence on subject matter. A 
voyage to Jupiter and a haunted hotel, Thackeray and Burgess, nuclear 
apocalypse and the Vietnam war ere all grist for the Kubrick mill and 
yet each film remains wedded to realism often in spite of rather then 
because of Its subject mbtter.
The choice of Kubrick's films to conduct the analysis of realism 
immediately establishes the parameters of the investigation because if 
Kubrick can make a space opera or a film about the supernatural which 
is realistic then the maintainence of the unity of experience is less 
crucial than the maintalnance of the unity of space and time for the 
generation of the realistic effect. Whereas extra-terrestrials or 
psychic experiences may be accomodated within a realistic work, 
violations of spatial or temporal unity put realism in check. The 
viewer is already conditioned to accept violations of the unity of 
experience by the codes of editing which have squired a familiarity 
such that they are no longer unrealistic in effect. As these modes of 
representation have come to affoct the forms of our experiences 
realism is no longer relative only to the forms of experiences but 
also to prior representations. This is true because part of our
/
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experlenca includes the experience of other works of art/other films.
It is then in terms of Kubrick's films that Meta will confront the 
codes of the filmic system In this dissertation.
The notion of a code, which is so important to the semiotioian, is 
simply the logical relationship between the elements of a sign system 
which allows a message to be understood. The filmmaker makes use of 
codes to 'put his message across', even if that is only to convey to 
the viewer a sense of ' the way things are is the way they ought to 
be'. The semiotioian makes use of the messages in a film to construct 
the codes, the laws governing those messages which enable them to 
speax to us. This is not to say that a filmmaker consciously follows 
certain pre-existing codes - codes are construetod after the fact of a 
film by semiotlcions.
The :haracteristics of cinematic codes are:
(a) Degrees of specificity: Coding precedes both Inside end outside
film. Metz defines which codes are 'specific' to film. Metz 
cites the example of "accelerated montage" (image A and B 
alternate in progresslvly shorter and quicker fragments - message 
■'! convergence: specially or dramatically) as a cinema-specific 
code. Cinema-specific codes are by their very nature not 
realistic through any process of transference from everyday 
life/perception, However, they may tie 'naturalised' over a period 
of time for the viewer by their repeated use in films. In other 
words the viewer of films, through repeated encounters with the 
medium, developea an internal cinema-specific frame of refernoe 
that persuades him or her of the 'realism' of what he or she is 
viewing. In so far as a cinema-specific code is standard to the 
medium it may be accorded the status of realistic which is 
Goodman's point that realism is a question of 'how standard the 
mode of representation has become' because we are unaware of the 
process of roodir.j, choosing and interpreting,
/One such cinema specific code utilised by Kubrick would be 
disruption of symmetry by violence expressed through a change from 
a smooth, symmetrical, composed shot to disruptive hand-held 
camera work: in 2001 A Space Odyssey the symmetrical geometry of
HM,'s memory bank disrupted by the free flowing Dave Bowman as he 
sets about 'unplugging' the computer; in A Clockwork Orange the 
symmetrical elegance of HOME disrupted, by the rape of Mrs 
Alexander: in Barry Lyndon the order and symmetry of military life 
disrupted by hand to hand combat; in The Shining the symmetry of 
the Hotel Overlook disrupted by the emergence of insanity and 
violence; and in Full Metal Jacket the symmetry of the platoon 
disrupted by the sniper's bullits. The hand held caters work 
subjectivizes the disruptions for the viewer. It is a realistic 
cinema specific code insofar as the viewer expects to be included 
in the action on screen, The viewer of a film like 
Earthouake(1875) does not expect static camera work Put rather an 
unsteady frame that is the natural point of view of the apectator 
of such a natural disaster. But it is also a real title code 
through reference to the specific body of work gemmated by 
Kubrick. The viewer, through reference to Kubrick's world, or 
what Goodman calls a’version, may accord the status of 'realistic'
Realism in the case of less 'film-specific' codes, such as those 
defined by Metz which are transfered from life into our perception 
of the film, depends upon a choice of appropriate cultural codes 
that will be interpreted as natural in the circumstances by the 
viewer. As these are cultural codes, in Barthes' sense, not 
specific to film, the filmmaker has to choose according to an 
already established awareness of codes in everyday life if he 
wishes to e,arner a particular response from his viewers. . e 
choice of a Rolls-Royce carries with it connotations of wealth and 
social status, different to the sort of wealth end social status 
that would be associated with a Lamborghini; the choice of caviar 
at Maxim's would indicate a different level of social status to 
the choice of 'burgers at MacDonald's.
Barthes explains in S/Z (1974) the realistic effect of the 
cultural as being an appeal to established and authorstative
cultural foiniB. By making a 'knowing' reference to the code, the 
code la held up as accepted wisdom or knowledge which it can tie 
accepted 'everyone knows1. The fact that such knowledge can be 
shown to he hased on a conventionally established 
aignif ier-sig' connection does net negate or deny the
realistic effect.
Kubrick utilizes the cultural code of 'costume' to multiply the 
ro.es of Peter Sellers (Group-Captain Lionel Mandrake/President 
Mu;"fley/Dr Strangelove/and originally Major T. J.'King' Kong) -n Dr 
Stroaelcvs and to chronicle the journey from innocence to 
experience of Ryan O'Neal in Barry Lyndon. He also rives us an 
interpretation of a character's honour, through duelling: he
employs the 'code of honour1 Implicit ir duelling to reveal Alex's 
opportunism in A Clockw .~k Orange where Alex lashes out in e. 
surprise attack on his three 'droogs' Dir, pete and Georgia in a 
slw motion parody of a duel and to indicate the positive 
quelities of Redmond Berry in Barry Lyndon, his courage (in the 
durl with Captain Quin) and his sense of honour and compassion (in 
the duel with Lord BullingcWi). The verbal duel between Joker and 
Animal Mother in Full Metal Jacket undermines the attainment of 
liorour for the duellist in the contemporary contex : and removes 
frtm the characters eny control over their destinies. Another 
device utilized by Kubrick to give an interpretation of a 
characters impotence is the wheelchair: the ex-Nasi advisor Dr
Strangelcve; Mr Alexander in A Clockwork Orange reduced to the 
rcxo of voyeur as his wife is raped; th* cuckolded husband of Lady 
Lyndon.
Ironically it may be Inaccurate stereotyping that la most 
successful in conveying realism unless the viewer happens to have 
made s close study o , for example, period costume. Director 
Bruoe Bereaford ill advisedly attempted to follow the exact words 
of the Bible in his film of King Davld(1985):
"So David went and brought up the ark of God from the house of 
Obededom into she city of David with gladness ... And David 
danced before the Lord with all his might; and David was girded 
with a linen ephod"(II S'muel 7:12-14 Authorised Version).
The unedifying sight: o*‘ .-ird Gere, clad only in a nappy, 
r : rg in the strtet? . n.ji is patently unacceptable to an
« * whosy oor : ■ - iv is derived from the House of
. • trreepe- • • ■ Cd ticity. Rvalism would be
• • -.-ved t: '% . r'-nV i' in flowing robes, with muas'.red
batid on -xp- a of interplay between what is seen and what
is evceu! . .. - nart of the viewer, and, apart from 'life'
pt.sviojs '.'i.:!', ui'* with film, In tl.ii -ense the realism is 
eviiven; .inly in tMia )f an internal r;iiierratic reference.
And f:.‘"ie".ly tliere are codes neither entirely non-specif:,c nor 
rpeelfte only tj film but rather spuoific to ore or other of the 
arts 'n conjunction with film. "Tes: are the codes film shares 
'■iifr, trie other arr.S: painting .jh.irss chiaroscuro lighting with 
Germat irsressionist films.
In Kubrick's work theatre is a principal reference shariig for 
example the code or the mask whether ' - be the carnival maste of 
Alex and his droogs in A Clockwork Orange to represent a rejection 
of civilization and reversion to animal pleasures; -:he nightmarish 
stylized make-up of Barry Lyndon, which is employed, i;s it was in 
Eighteenth Century society, to powder ovsr the reprssfied libido; 
or indeed the ':aricaturt- mask of facial expression '•‘hieh is more 
an inner inask chat Kubri ck coaxes to the surface tc rearrange the 
facial features of kv.a characters (the mask of inseijty on Jack 
Torrance (Jack Nicholson) in The Shining, the mask of death on 
Jflkor iHa'-thew Modi' •) in Full Metal Jacket}.
Ref-rtr.ce can also be made to:
(!) the codes of danoe - the carefully choreographed vio’fncu of A
/
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Clockwork Orange,
"Alex's erotic ballets with Mrs Alexander and the Cat Lady are 
also dances of death" (Ciment 1963 p67V,
(li) the codes of painting - in John Alcott’s lighting photography 
in for example Barry Lyndon, reminiscent of a Gainsborough 
landscape; and
(ill) the codes of music -the forties World War II ballad "We’U  
meet again, don't I now where, don't know when ..." is the Ironic 
soundtrack for the destruction of the world in World War III 
during the closing shot of Dr Stangelove, while "Try a Little 
Tenderness", accompanies footage of bombers in flight and "When 
Johnny Comes Marching Home" compliments the image of pilots on a 
suicide mission. "The Blue Danube" is, used to accompany the 
orbiting Space Station 5 evoking the music of the spheres and the 
joy of a ride on the Big Wheel in Vienna's Prater.
If these codes work to realistic effect is not necessarily a 
question of whether they work in a realistic way in the other arts 
but rather a question of how naturally they work with the filmed 
actioi. Masks, for example, are not themselves realistic 
representations but the dehumanizing, chilling effect they have on 
■he vearer is realistic enough to evoke fear in the audience 
confronted by a threatening mask-wearer. Or again, it is hard to 
imagine what a realistic piece of music would be but very often 
the employment of soundtrack music can be realistic if an 
explanation can be ofered for its presence (a car radio, a street 
organ). Often it is not essential for the music to be explained 
in this way for it to be accepted unnuestiortin&ly by the viewer: 
while the obviously satrirical comment of "We'll meet again" draws 
attention to itself and so can hardly be regarded as a realistic 
accompaniment for an image of mass destruction, the Blue Danube 
evokes only the feelings in the viewer that would accompany a ride 
on a ferris wheel without consciously referring the viewer to that 
subconscious feeling of spinning weightlessness that would 
realistically accompany first impressions of an orbiting space 
station of this design. The music draws the viewer into the
//
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experience more realistically than the strict realism of dead
silence yould.
(b) Levels of commonality; Codes can be distinguished by the 
commonality of their appearance in films- The panarama shot is a 
general code according to Metz as it could be in any film •• it 
follows that it can have various significations. It can orlt as a 
descriptive shot or a movement shot. Slow motion is also a
general code as familiar to TV sports viewers as 'action film' 
lovers. (Slow motion is usually employed to lyricize the violent 
death of one of the chief protagonists.) So familiar that Kubrick 
can employ it as a satirizing device by inverting the code. The 
orgy in A Clockwork Orange is filmed in skip-frame high-speed
"It seemed to me a good way to satirize what had become the 
fairly common use of slow motion to solemnize this sort of
thing, and turn it into ’art"’. (Kubrick interview in Cinent 
1983 p!52)
It is the level of generality of a code which can determine its
realistic effect. This would be true in the case of ciiema
specific codes, as has already been pointed out, because it is 
only the frequency with which a code of this nature iu .bed that 
can invest the code with an aura of familiarity.
Alex's dream sequences in A Clockwork Orange are easily identified 
as belonging to the 'historical epic' genre because they emulate 
the particular codes of directors like Cecil B. De Mille (and
inoeed Kubrick's own Spartacus) that is, innovative visual and
technical effects, impressive formal compositions, rhythmic
editing and pseudo-hiutorlcsl ambience. Kubrick also utilizes the 
codes of the film nolr period by reducing indirect lighting so as 
„o create contrasts, shadows, herd features and using unusual 
camera angles, authentic darkness, depth of focus and narrow 
lenses. This is more true of his earlier films like Paths of 
Glory, Killer's Kiss and The Killing but extends its influence
Dr Stanaelove and A Clockwork Orange
Space Odyssey

A text as context for codes adds to the Individual messages - a total 
signification. In fact the text organises the codes in a logical 
system that confers value on the messages. The patterning takes place 
along two axes. The syntagmatic axis i-, the horizontal flow of 
successive messages linked in the text. Narrative is syntagmatic 
signification within the codes. The paradigmatic axis is the vertical 
dimension of selectivity. A film draws on or creates paradigms giving 
us meanings through association. This is a dimension not dependent on 
narrative but rather on a selection of details in no particular order.
The fuM meaning of a text Is the interweaving of the axes of 
selection and combination.
The axes of selection and combination provide a useful method for 
approaching th; realistic film text:
- the paradigmatic axis where the realism arisas out of the selection 
cf codes ana
- the syntagma:ic axis where tl.e realism arises out of the combination 
of codes.
7h5s process of selection and combination by which the total
signification 'if the text is generated, is communicated to the viewer 
In ttfo w-.ys - denotatively and conotatively. According to Metz the 
viewer first reads an Image for its denotative content: the material 
on the screen .s the signifier of denotation, the scene represented is 
the signified (its meaning). The film image has denotative meaning
simply by beir.g what it is: a cinematic record communicating an
accurate description of the same thing (beyond that which spoken 
language r- capable of). The viewer then considers whet the image 
connotes: the product vf the relationship between signifier and
e'gnified is » sign which is the signifier of a eonnotative
relationship, 'an impression of ...’ (Its signified). A film has a 
connotative ability not least because; of its ability to record other
The connotative aspect of spoken language (which is at the core of its 
expressive ability) is available to film through Its soundtrack, as 
indeed are the connotative aspects of painting, music, drama, dance.
Clockwork Oronae 'The Korova Milk Bar1,1 JME',
Mythologies 11985
dispenses mllkplus through
red ZBM Seleebrle, while
/pick up his wife, in a red pyjama suit, engulfed by a white 
modernistic chair shaped like a lopsided egg and upholstered in 
the assertive hues of Korova purple. As before, decor - the 
arrangement of shapes and colours within a confined space - 
absorbs people as well as things into the configurations of a 
clo.kwork aesthetic. In the hallway, as Alex and his masked 
droogs invade this museum advertised on an illuminated sign as 
the archetypal HOME, mirrors on each side of a chessboard floor 
create a triptych that recalls the static duplications first 
seen in the Korova Milkbar. ... Alex not only disrupts HOME'S 
Korovn-ltki' stasis, but forces Alexander to watch as his wife is 
twisted in,;o an animated version of a Korova sex-machine ... in 
the context of the Korova's sexual postures and its unnatural 
colours ((right oranges and purples) in the midst of a 
predcninanlly black and white world, as well as HOME'S 
heterosexucl sterility (the Alexanders spawn objects instead of 
children), Alex's rape of the wife/mother has the virtue of 
being a 'ncrmal' (even if Oedipsl) expression of an unrepressed 
Uuido, Alex's killing of the Cat Lady extends this sexual 
allegory even further, when first introduced, the Cat Lady is 
an upeide-cawn figure in a landscape of erotic paintings showing 
women in various states of sexual excitement, either 
•MSturtiatory or Lesbian, Overall, she assumes a character and 
definition several steps higher on the aesthetic ladder then 
Alex's own Mum, making her the decadent rather than pathetic 
mother-figure: Em (Sheila Raynor), for instance, decorates her
home in a ghastly combination of colours (electric blue and pink 
in the living room; yellow, silver and orange reflective 
checkers in the kitchen) and with discount store paintings of 
darkly erotic women who oil look alike, and she wears Brightly 
coloured orlon wigs (like the statues in the Korova) and vinyl 
miniskirts to disguise both her age and maternal status.
But the Cat Lady totally denies her potential for procreation 
(one which Em ... symbolically denies). She lives amidst 
losbian self-portraits ... colors herself like an art object ... 
and twists her body into mechanical contortions that resemble a
(i) Paradigmatic Choices:
Malcolm McDowell In the Cat lady's house threatening the Cat 
Lady/camera with a phallic 'art object1 reveals a multitude of
1 /  
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which depersonalizes the menace•
- the framing and depth of focus which contextualize the 
action in terms of the lesbian and masturbatory artworks aa 
opposed to a shot which through different framing and focus 
would decontextuelize Alex's stance relinquishing connotations 
of "sexual function" displacing "sgxual extensions"(Melson 
1962 pl49).
- the contents of the shot - phallic object, codpiece, rubber 
nose carefully composed and directed at the camera - carry 
connotations of male dominant phallic sexuality over female 
denial of procreative potentiality.
to change an aspect of the manner of filming is to change the 
signification. The way of presenting an image, while it 
remains denotatively identical, changes its connotation with 
resultant shifts in the meaning we attach to it, The 
filmmokefs paradigmatic choices involve a perceived 
siml.lt..-icy between the shots that form the set of possible 
uandidites that1could be substituted for each other In the 
given circumstances. In this way metaphor is generated: it
the fi.l.nwtakar, wishing to communicate a particular message to 
his e.idlence, substitutes one shot for another without 
suppressing the difference between the two he may achieve this 
communscotijn through the device of metaphor. Alex's 
masturbation moves to orgasmic climax as successive zooms move 
closer to Beethoven's face until his eyes stare directly into 
the camera, then to a painting of a nude woman with a smiling 
look of sexual invitation and then down to Alex's snake 
seemingly about to enter her vaginal opening and within the 
same shot, four Christ; figures joined in a passion of 
celebration and repeated close-ups of Alex as Dracula, hanging 
figures, avalanches and explosions - all of which are 
substituted for the mo' J direct portrayal common to 
pornographic oinema. Ii a basically realistic medium, 
mataptvsr represents a pul) in the opposite direoBion away from
the illusion of recording reality. As has been suggested the 
file rnedium rather he.s a metonymic character in general.
(ii) SyntagmaClc Choices; A shot does not stand in isolation in a 
film but rather ss part of a sequonce of shots, ao it is not 
surprising that connotation should also arise from the 
juxtaposition of a particular shot with the shots preceding 
end following it. Here the viewer's sense of connotation does 
not arise from comparison with potential shots but with the 
actual shots the filmmaker has combined in bracketing a 
particular shot, The realistic sequence is the one that 
ideology suggests is tine iroet natural in the given context. 
The greatest degree of naturalism would be achieved by a 
sequence that did nnt draw attention to the movement from one 
shot to the next: not the 'life giving energy1 of
Eisenstein's shot collisions - the Juxtaposition of images 
like the face of a man and the picture of a fox or a shot of a 
crowd and one of a bull being slaughtered (Strike (1925)) - 
but rather the flow of shots in Hitchcock's shower sequence in 
Psycho(1960) - the seventy separate shots in less than sixty 
seconds ere experienced as continuous as they are 
psychologically fused into the single connotation of horror 
for the viewer. It is not coincidental that the oame director 
is responsible for the film Rope(1948) which attempts to 
eliminate syntagmatic choices by filming the action in one 
continuous shot, not of course that a greater degree of 
naturalism is synonymous with a decrease in number of shots. 
No such simple aquation could be applied in every situation 
and indeed the very reverse may be true if the sv tained shot 
hao the effect of drawing attention to itself. In Barry 
Lyndon the shot of Barry (Ryan O'Neal) kneeling next to Lady 
Lyndon's (Moi'issa Bsreneon's) bath end holding her hand, is 
followed by the shot of his Kissing her in the bath. This 
gives to the kneeling shot a connotation of genuine affection 
in contrast to the rest of the film, It is preceded by Lady 
Lyndon's companion reading a French poem to her:
i.
'Lee ouaurs I'un par V autre 
“ttirSs 
Se comunlquent 
leur gustanee 
Tals deux miroire ardents 
Concentrent la lumlire
et se la r6fl6chissent 
Lee rayona tour 6 tour 
requeillis 
... dlviaea 
En se multlpltant 
S'accrioBsent, a1 embiillissent 
Et d'autant plus autifs 
Ou'ila se sent plus i:rois6s 
Au mSme point so rSunlasent
(Two hearts by each other
asrracted
Communicate
their substance 
Like two burning mirrors 
Concentrating light
and reflecting It back 
The beams collected
.,. divided 
By multiplying 
Grow larger and more beautiful 
And becoming the more active 
The more they intersect 
Are at one and the same point
reunited".) 
(transl. Ciment 1983 pile)
This gives the kneeling scene the connotation of reason and 
passion reunited in the persona of the opportunistic Barry and 
his loving wife.1
This combinatory axis involves the concept of metonomy, 
Metonomy ia the use of associated details to convey an idea or 
object, n figure of speech allied to synecdoche which involves 
a part being used to stand for the whole or vice-versa. 
Bowmen's journey in 2001 A Space Odyssey through the 
'Star-Oata' presented as an 'orgy of colour, shape, images, 
light, explosions and movement is a metonymic device intended 
to connote a Journey into infinity, indeed 'beyond the 
infinite’, to the 'other side’ of reality, time end space. 
(Simply a more complex version of the cinematic clichS of 
newspaper headlines whirling past to designate the passage of 
time). The foetus (or 'Star-Child') which appears at the 
closing sequence of 2001 A Space Odyssey is a aynecdochic 
device which connotes rebirth, a new dawn or even more
rtiguity
i" (Lodge 1977 pS4).
Monaco (1961 p!40), borrowing from liter
I '
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expansion through tropes of comparison: paradigmatica]ly,
syntagmatically or metaphorically.
The priority of rionntattnn is not an indisputable necessity - 
this is particularity evident in the cinema. The process that 
leads from sensation through perception to signification in 
cinema demands the activity and time of interpretation. Setz 
recognises that 'he split between denotation and connotation 
in most cinematic codes aligns it with literature rather then 
music or architecture (the purely connotative). In cinema we 
appear to recognise a signified (the denotative base) before 
we attend to thu significations it evokes through its manner 
of presentation. What this means la that there are separate 
codes for denotation and for connotation: Metz held that the
former enable recognition of the object/action and the latter 
precede from these objects to more abstract significations. 
If this sounds suspiciously like connotation is the decoration 
added to denotation, Met* insisted that connotation was the 
fcrm of denotation. Talk about the contents of the image is 
talk at the level of connotation. Denotation and connotation 
pertain to the analysing of the sign rather than its 
functioning. Ml levels are present simultaneously and it is 
up to the analyst as to how far he wishes -:o pursue his 
analysis. Roland Barthes, originally a subscriber to 
Hjelmslev's classic formulation maintaining the dependence of 
connotation on denotation (Mythologies(1S85)). argued in 
Systlme de la inode( 1967) that denotation exists only as the 
final sum of connotation. Denotation for Barthes is not the 
origin of all other meanings but the settling down to proper 
performing of meaning in such and such a sltuat:.-.
The communication of the signification of a ti 
explained in terms of connotation and denotation, 
return to the actual generation of the significatio
I
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overcome the limitations of si 
of incomplete images (as desc 
filmmaker is not limited by s 
iss to the cinematic co 
hk ent within the frame and 
choice is thus also between f<
: representation by means
.e of relationship b 
novement of the camera. 
Llowing the movements c 
subject to move into a
The closed font, is apparent in a scene such a Alex’s 
interrogation in A Clockwork Orange- The frame constricts 
the action just os the interrogators hem Alex into a corner.
On the other hsnd the slow right to left track revealing 
Joker, Rafterman. Cowboy, Animal Mother ... (in Full Metal 
Jacket) crcuchinj for protection behind sandbags does not 
specifically frame each character but rather alludes to the 
extension of the line beyond the frame to both left and 
right. The opun frame is the cinematic equivalent of 
painting's imcortplete image extending what is directly 
presented ci, semen to an illusory reality off screen. It 
is the very opposite of the post-eredernis't impulse towards 
the revelation of the artifice of the realist artwork.
plane of space 
filmmaker focuse
concern the plane of the frame, the 
the frame and the depth plane. The 
■ur attention on these planes: as the
codes of the three planes interact according to his 
composition. For example, overlapping takes place on the 
first plane , while convergence and relative size take place 
on the second. By shooting Shelley Winters and James Mason 
in bed in Lolita, Winters with her back to the camera, Mason 
staring at the photograph between the bed and the camera 
that the viewer knows to be of Lolita, Kubrick evinces a 
co-ordination of the plane of space and plane of depth: our
perception of depth depends upon factors in the plane of 
space, chiefly relative size in this instance. The
I
significance of these codes can be demonstrated in a shot 
like the one described here: a family relationship
overshadowed by the Image of Lolita - represented by the 
photograph in the foreground. The proximity of the 
photograph to the camera and its proportion in relation to 
the other elements designates its importance. The majority 
of compositional elements take place on the dominant frsune 
plane and a large number of these depend for their effect on 
factors of which we are largely unaware.
The effect of having Poole falling Into the void in 2001 A
the pursuing craft on the left. Because we habitually read 
from left to right, ne see trie Image from left to right and 
Poole Is moving away from the craft and into the void. 
Filmed the opposite way around toe reverse would appear to 
becase: Pools moving towards the craft and safety. It is
the filmmaker who understands how to appeal to the viewer's 
subconscious reading of planes who will be able to present 
the action in a way the viewer will consider realistic.
0 Form, Line, Colour: Just as a frame is invested with
meaning even before the filmmaker begins to fill It, so the 
meaning carries inherent values which the filmmaker cen 
exploit. The Shining Is u good examy.1% of how colour is 
employed to chart the progression towards madness 
psychologically, and a masculine ethos - symbolically.
The former is achieved through the obvious choice of the 
colour red as It carries with it psychological implications 
of violence, anger, blood, murder: so Jack's clothing moves
from browns and greens towards red (the maroon coloured 
jacket he dons in the latter part of the film), the 
conversation with Grady (one of Jack's two shlnings) takes 
place in a red bathroom and Danny's shinings all involve red 
- the butchered Grady children, the blood elevator, REDRUM.
As the colour red has a psychologically documented and 
culturally entrenched value it can be exploited by Kubrick 
to evoke empathetic reactions in his viewers thereby 
enhancing the realistic effect of horror.
The progression, symbolically, towards a masculine ethos is 
achieved by use of the colour yellow. The colour yellow 
picks up from the Navajo motif: the Overlook Hotel is built
on = Navajo burial ground, it is decorated in an indigenous 
Navajo style and the Colorado Lounge (scene of jack's 
labours/ isolation/deterioration) is dominated by a Navajo 
sand painting of four males. Yellow is the male colour 
according to Nevajc symbolism and as Jack and the Overlook's 
past begin co assert themselves, it is a masculine 
threatening assert:.veness directed against the rest of the 
family and yellow oeeomee the dominant colour. The Grady 
murder corridor has yellow wallpaper, Jack works on yellow 
paper, his face anc eyas at the bar (his other shining with 
Lloyd the bartender) have a yellow hue repeated as he stands 
outside the bathroom with an axe (Wendy cowering inside is 
in blue, the Navajo female colour), the walls are made 
yellow by the Interior lighting as Jack stalks the corridors 
while the Gold Room and corridor are almost nauseatingly 
yellow/gold. It is a yellow tennis ball that Jack throws 
against the sand painting and that intrudes on Danny's game 
to lure him into Room 237 and it is even a yellow liquer - 
Advocaat - that Grady spills on Jack’s red jacket. An 
understanding of then masculine ethos of yellow may not be 
understood outside of the Navajo community but it is 
Kubrick's evocation of this symbolism in the filmed 
narrative that subconsciously engenders an 'understanding' 
of the 'meaning of ysllow' in the viewer. No knowledge of 
Navajo culture is required for Kubrick's use of colour to 
provide a psychological underpinning for the consciously 
perceived plot. The use of colour in this way serves the 
Interests of realism. Kubrick achieves the effect of
'horror' through an understanding,of the inherent values of 
form, colour and line and so employing them to generate an 
effect so realistic it is 'horrifying'.
(v) Lighting: The choice of lighting can alter the significance
of almost every other choice considered above. Lighting 
codes operating in film are well known to the photographer:- 
+ Lighting from below creates a sinister effect. Jack
Nicholson's melevolen-e in The Shining is enhanced by the
underlighting at the be. ‘.n the Gold Room as the Overlook's 
past resurrects itself.
+ Lighting from the side creates contrast and -nbigulty. 
The dual nature of Malcolm McDowell as 'our friend and 
narrator' and as perpetrator of 'ultra-violent=', as 
aggressor and as victim, is mirrored by the side-lighting of 
his features in the opening enot of A Clockwork Orange.
♦ Lighting from above has a spiritual effect. Marlssa
Berenson is 6 creature or pure and innocent love - almost
angelic when she accepts Barry's apology for a love scorned 
in Barry Lyndon.
+ Lighting from behind creates a silhouette effect. The 
silhouette can range from romantic to frightening depending 
on the context. The effect of Jack's silhouette in The 
Shining, or indeed that of Alex and his droogs in A 
Clockwork Orange is to come between the viewer and the light 
source (with all the connotations of light versus dark) and 
so present a threatening presence on the screen. It is 
interesting to note that Kubrick is strictly authentic in 
his chioce of lighting sources. In other words, although 
his effects are carefully conceived, there is always an 
explanation available to the viewer for the lighting effect: 
the illuminated bar in the Gold Room accounts for the 
yellow hue of Jack Torrance's face in The Shining: the
footlights of the Overlook's hedge maze account for the 
sinister mask on Jack's face as he lopes after Danny.
lighting such
Barry Lyndon,
The Shining.
I
/
*
In The Shining our attention focuses exclusively on Jack as 
he pursues the retreating Wendy/camera across the Colorado 
Lounge and up the stairs - there is no escape either for 
Wendy or our eyes which remain tightly focused on the 
pursuer, On the other hand in Barry Lyndon we have to scan 
the entire frame to locate Barry among the troops lead by 
Hardy Kruger - emphasizing hie entrapment in the violence 
and death of the Seven Years War. Kubrick is a master of 
depth of focue which allows him to fill the scene with 
details which may register consciously only after numerous 
viewings iin the pencil holder on Oilman's desk as he 
narrates the story of the Grady murder to Jack Torrance in 
The Shiningi is a miniature axe; In the 'Underground' record 
section of the Record Bar Mex in ft Clockwork Oranaevisive 
is a copy of the 2001 A Space Odyssey soundtrack .,.),
Soft focus creates a smooth, distant, romantic effect. As 
Ryan O'Neal (Redmond Barry) attends to Gey Hamilton (his 
cousin Nora) so the soft focus creates a suitably romantic 
feeling in Barry Lyndon, whereas the sharp focus aboard the 
space ships of 2001 ft Space Odyssey conveys an impression of 
authenticity. In terms of the dynamic shot, it ie focus 
changes within a shot that bear consideration, Here the 
filmmaker is concerned with dimullng the viewer's attention 
by some device such as tho "rack focus' which moves our 
attention from one object to nor or the 'follow focus’ 
which concentrates our attenti./i. on one subject despite its 
movements. If the required effect of focussing attention is 
achieved in such away as to draw Attention to itself, the 
realistic effect is automatically ■-•iminished.
(ill) Angle: The filmmaker must choose from the three sets of
axes that determine the shot -
- The pan axis (vertical) or angle of approach. This is 
dither the square approach which emphasizes the aspect of 
design or an oblique approach which gives more of an effect
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working in a baaically realistic medium,
) Camera movement: Not only ie the camera revolving in tha
ways described above But it ia also moving around - through 
tracking or crane shots. The tracking shot enhances our 
sense of depth perception and offers the possibility of 
emphasizing the central subject by closely following It or 
focusing attention on the camera as it changeu from one 
subject to another. It is a technique useful for point of 
view shots, creating a sense of movement, generating 
suspense, effecting surprise ... . For example, Qianetti 
suggests that the reverse track (so favoured by Kubrick) le 
a • device to emphasise psychological and physical 
information.
"...[A Clockwork Orange] opens with a close-up of the 
protagonist (McDowell) staring brazenly at the camera. On 
the soundtrack we hear his confidential commentary which 
establishes an intimate if uneasy rapport between him and 
us: we become his confidants. Once this intimacy ie
established,. Kubrick pulls back and offers us a wider and 
longer view or the protagonist's ohysical environment - a 
Wierd 'milk bar1 [the Korova] where he end his 'droogs' 
sit in a drug-induced stupor" (Qianetti 1982 pio?).
There is also the zoom which would seem to Ue similar to the 
tracking shot in effect but is deceptive in that it does not 
actually move into the scene. The result is a somewhat 
foreign effect as we do not experience this in everyday 
life. According to Ciment the reverse scorn allows Kubrick 
to appropriate filmic space without the sense of confinement 
associated with the reverse track while retaining a powerful 
scrutiny of the subject and setting (Ciment 1983 pll4) - a 
device moat comwily observed in Barry Lyndon. Once again, 
should the camera movement, or even lack of movement, draw 
attention to itself the realistic effect is lost.
) Point of view: This is a rather more abstract notion than
Ithe choice of 'perspective/angles'. The choice is basically 
subjective or objective, first person narration or 
omniscient narration. This is a straight forward enough 
choice confronting the author of a novel. If someone in the 
story - whether a minor or major character - narrates the 
events it ia first person narration and if someone outside 
the story - whether a separate •haracter or entirely devoid 
of character (although this narrator of course reflects the 
author1e personality) - narrates thm events it is an 
omniscient narrotor. But the filmmaker is not confronted by 
such a cl'-arly differentiated choice. Most films are told 
from an omniscient point of view - for a very good reason. 
First person narration fal:s to achieve what it professes to 
be; although we may hear the narrator, we also see the film
and so obtain an 'ob.iectiie' Insight into what is meant to
be a subjective account. For this reason Harper Lee's To 
Kill A Mockingbird (1960) which chronicles the violence, 
eccentricities and prejudices of the Southern United States 
through the unique first person narration of a child makes 
an unexceptional screen adaptation which can only present 
the plot, cast the children aa its heroes and provide a 
narrator to try and repeat some of thn children's insights. 
The point of view of the film is not that of the 
recollecting narrator but of the filmmaker who can not 
provide hia audience with the visual experiences of a child, 
In terms of realism this general fact about a film's point 
of view Is a two edged sword i on the one hand the 
'objectivity' of the camera argues In favour of Batinlan
ontological realism but the 'subjectivity' of our everyday
perception argues for more expressionistic filmmaking - 
perhaps Mary Popping(Dlshey 1964) is a more realistic 
expression of what a child sees than To Kill A 
Mockingbird)Mulligan 1962).
, <
Alex may wall t 
Orange but he
'our friend and narrator' 
also the object of our
in A Clockwork 
viewing. For
1
Z.Syntagnatlc Axis:
t2. 'Jack Torrance1 in a 1921 photograph of a July the 4th Ball 
at the Overlook hanging on the wall of the Gold Corridor, which
the action that here it is singled out for particular
attention.
The juxtaposition of the two shots does not undermine the 
realism of the film but rather provides the viewer with a 
proposed resolution by suggesting a possible meaning previously 
overlooked in the course of the Him just as the content of the 
photograph previously passed unnoticed. What; do the individual 
shots mean? The first means that Jack has found his way to the 
centre of the labyrinth - end the nothingness that awaits. In 
his search for immortality he has denied his humanity 
(fallibility, uncertainty, hop?) and has lost his soul In the 
timeless roeze of the Overlook. The second reveals Jack 
su-rounded by revellers of a 1921 ball amid 21 other pictures in 
the hotel’s reception aree - its meaning is recurrance "a Jack 
re-encountered " (Kubrick interviewed in Cicnent 19831. Taken 
together the 1921 .photograph giv=s an image of normality while 
the present time image of .lack's frozen face is the image of 
madness. This 'collective1 meaning acts as an inversion of the 
earlier evolution which doubled tne normality - the present Jack 
as father, wi-itfr and teacher »ith a hideous pact, not yet 
forgotten. The multiplication of meaning that arises from the 
Juxtaposition of two shots with their own meanings approximates 
the multiplicity of meanings that confronts the perceiver of 
'everyday reality1.
(b) The communication of a large body of information in a short time 
by the weaving together of a series of short shots. Consider 
Nelson's explanation of the last three minutes of Barry Lyndon - 
the vast amount of information and meaning conveyed by a series 
of short shots.
"The final two episodes of Barry Lyndon unite Barry's tragic 
fate and Lady Lyndon's private sorrow, while they express,
5Kubrick's Barry Lyndon leaves i-
I
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/a fairly unimportant action taking place in real time is likely 
to be boring and undercut the tempo of the action so the ’dead 
time' can be pared away. The Hollywood grammar maintains that 
this can only be accomplished 'invisibly' by inserting a shot of 
something else to account for the missing time or changing the 
camera angle noticably for the viewer. Should the montage 
become visible, according to This theory, the focus of the 
viewer shifts from the mechanics of the plot to the mechanics of 
montage and the illusion of reality is destroyed. Contemporary 
styling is far less rigid and car, accommodate directors like 
Jan-Luc Godard who jump-cuts in mid-scene in a film like 
Breathless(I960) to generate a nervous reckless, brash rhythm by 
ignoring the Hollywood rules. The realist filmmaker is not 
forced to operate within the confines of the Hollywood grammar 
any more than the nature of realism I am discussing in this 
paper is constrained by the Xinteenth Century literary 
understanding of the term.
A second choice that confronts the filmmaker is the length of 
individual shots: within themselves and in relation to the 
adjoining shots. Hollywood montage demands a cut just after the 
climax while contemporary director: often maintain a shot long 
after the climax.
Alain Tanner talking about his film In the White City(1983): 
"Since I often do lengthy shots, which are sometimes a whole 
sequence, I can’t, as they say, correct it in the editing. 
But of course the editing is important: I think that the 
longer a shot is the more vital it is to find the exact frame 
to cut it. If you make a film with a thousand shots in the 
classical way, you can give it to a good professional editor 
and he will be able to put it together for you. But with my 
film, he wouldn't know what to do about it. To give you an 
example: there's a shot of a curtain being ruffled by the wind 
- no camera movement, nobody in shot, just the open window and 
the curtain. The shot lasts eighty seconds - very long. But
what's time in the cinema? This eighty seconds probably 
represents a whole afternoon. If I gave that shot to a 
traditional editor, he might take three seconds and say that's 
quite enough. But with my editor (Laurent Uhler) it took us a 
long time to decide: was ten seconds too long, or was a minute 
too short?" (Pullaine 1983/d) 
the Hollywood grammar can not be regarded as an absolute for 
delimiting the length of shots required for a realistic effect. 
This is far to rigid, a notion of what constitutes realism.
Montage is also used to abandon strict chronology.
(a) Parallel montage alternates between two separate stories by 
cutting from one to the other repeatedly. It is this device 
that allows Kubrick to delay showing us whet happened to 
Danny in Room 237 until Jack goes to investigate has story 
about a woman who attacked him in the Room. Then the two 
'Shinings' become confused (it is also not evident which 
parts are Halloran's shining in his hotel room in Miami), 
Danny's experience of an old decomposing hag rising from the 
bath water and Jack's erotic encounter with a young nude 
woman who becomes the hideous hag once he embraces and
(b) Flashback and flash-forward: which allows the director to 
communicate related, tangential material or preview the 
action. The Shining overflows with flashbacks/ forwards as 
the Overlood's past resurrects itself. Danny's 'shinings' 
include the 'blood elevator' which is a flash forward to a 
stage in the film where the past lias resurrected itself and 
confronts Wendy, the Grady daughters which is a flashback 
into the hotel's past and a flash forward to the impending 
fate of the family and REDRUM which is flash forward to the 
transformation of Jack when he tries to reenact the past as 
detailed in the flashbacks. Jack's shinings include a 
conversation with the barman, Lloyd which is a flashback to
/
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iforwards and the self conscious contrivance of involuted 
montage will become apparent to the detriment of the 
realistic effect.
The match cut deserves special mention as the most common 
dev'ce for linking two very different scenes. This is 
achieved by repetition of action, form or mise en scene. 
James Monaco claims
"Sttinle? Kubrick's match cut in 2001 A Space Qddysse.y. 
between a pre-histcric bone whirling in the air and a 
twenty-first-century speae station revolving in space, is 
possibly the most ambitious match cut in history, since it 
attempts to unite prehistory with the future 
anthropologically at the same time as it creatbs a special 
meaning within the cut itself by emphasising the functions 
Of both bone end space station as tools, extensions of 
human capabilities" (Monaco 1981 pl85)
By achieving a smooth transition between two very different 
scenes the match cut enhances the’ realistic illusion that 
might otherwise suffer from the abvupt transition required 
of the viewer.
Thus the codes of montage are a great deal more complex than 
would at first appear to be the case. Mata tried to 
formulate a Grands Syntagmatlque and so synthesize the
theories of montage. What he wants is to define the nature
of narrative units in a film. So the Grande Syntagmatlque 
is the attempt: to provide for the description of narrative 
discourse in terms of cinematic language. Narrative is Been 
to be the product of e code of interrelationships between 
shots. Meta holds that there are eight syntagma in the 
major paradigm of elements which permit the structuring of 
denotation. It is a linguistic model of the process of a 
director's decision on how to put all the shots and
sequences together, his use of a particular cinematic
discourse. Just as the speaker draws his utterances from
the potential utterances and constructions available to him, 
so the director draws from Metz's eight categories for each 
sequence of his film.
1. The first is the autonomous segment: that is one shot,
this can be either a long take or short inserts. If an 
insert it may be:
a) Nondleeetic: shows something external to the action, 
ti) Subjective: an image related to a character.
c) Displaced dieeetic: an image related to the main 
action but not dominant.
d) Explanatory: a different (clossr/angled) shot to give
2. The second type is parallel montage: "montage brings 
together and interweaves two or more alternating 
'motifs', but no precise relationship (whether temporal 
or spatial) '.s assigned to them at least on the level 
of denotation" (Metz 1974a p:25)
3. The third type la bracket syntacsu "a aeries of very
brief scenes representing occurendes that the film gives
as typical samples of a same order of reality, without In 
any way chronologically locating them in relation to each
other"(Metz 1674c pl2S),
Where 2 and 3 are nonchronologicel, the rest are '.11 
chronological on a denotative level
4. The fourth type la the descriptive ayntaam: the 
chronology is simultaneous - the various shots coexist at 
the same moment.
5. The fifth type is the narrative syntagm: this is
consecutive, the actual passage of time. The alternative 
narrative syntagm is the switching from A to B to A to B 
and so on - time is consecutive but A and B occur
simultaneously.
6. The sixth type is the scene: the continuous flow of time
which is consecutive.
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7, The sevnt. type ia tha eplaodle sequence■. "strings 
together a number of very brief scenes which are _usually 
separated from each other by optical devices (dissolves, 
etc) and which succeed each other in chronological 
order"(fiistz is/4a piiU).
6. The eigth type is tha ordinary sequence: a single action
with spatial and temporal breaks. "... the sequence is 
based on the unity of a more complex action .,. that 
'skipp' those portions of itself that it intends to leave 
out and that is therefore apt to unfold in several 
different locations (unlike the scene)"(Metz 1974a pl32),
Reproducing Metz's synthesis of the theories of montage 
without an attendant elucidation may not serve as a useful 
guide to the structuring of denotation but it does 
represent, in one sense, the apogee of semiological 
cinematic code analysis, ks such it irrevocably disconnects 
realism from any account other than an effect oriented 
account. The semiotic task of untangling the codes that 
constitute the filmic system has revealed, the <tieobe.nisms of 
the realistic film - in this sense destroying the illusion 
of reality reproduced. The signs of the film medium 
reproduce at best one aspect of the reality as we conceive 
it, It is a partial duplication of something we already 
know whlchpartially coincides with the everyday reality. 
What we see is what language has named for us and what we 
see in film is meaningful to the extent that it supports our 
semantic universe.
The vindication of the account of realism comes with the delineation 
of the attainment of realism as an effect In film and the perception 
that the familiarity of the mechanisms whereby this effect is attained 
is the key to realism. That these mechanisms are subject to change 
with the discovery of newer ones is basic to toe account of realism
and is nowhere contradicted by the analysis of those mechanisms in 
this chapter. The final vindication of an effect based account of 
realism comes with the perception that a film about Vietnam can be 
talked about In the same breath as one about a haunted hotel in 
uomuiidtracing the use of a particular mechanism of realist filmmaking, 
Nowhere was the content of the film an issue in the analysis of 
realism in film. The interplay between the role of the artist in 
generating the effect and the responses of the viewer was the real 
issue with reg vds to what was to be labelled realistic or 
non-realietic.
That semiological analysis has located film among the other arts 
through successful application of an account of reaiiim developed in 
relation to the other arts finally shuts the door on claims about 
film's unique tie to reality because of its mechanical reproduction of 
reality. Metz's Grand Syntaematlque alone should serve to dispel the 
myth of sheer re-presentation of spatial reality. Even the appeal to 
Peirce's tripartite division of the sign and the suggested fact that 
the cinematic image is a perfect amalgam of icon, index and symbol 
does little more than suggest why realism is so easily attainable by 
film. This can net be elevated to the status of a prescriptive 
aesthetic.
4.PC'
6. CONCLUSION
Thils dissertation set out to provide an account of realism in art and 
apply this account to the case of film.
In order to fulfill this aim is approached the problem of realism from 
four different perspectives, utilizing the seminal theorist's 
contribution in each case as representative of the particular 
approach,
Approaching the question of realism from the point of view of the 
philosophy of art, Nelson Goodman offered three basic usages of the 
term that would serve as the foundation of the account. First Goodman 
used the term to differentiate between realist and non-realist works 
of art by arguing that familiarity is the deciding criterion. The 
essential point to be gleaned from this usage of the term was that 
realism is the effect of familiarity. That the effect of familiarity 
is not a static notion was allowed for by Goodman's argument that the 
discovery of new effects allows for a greater degree of realism, for 
the revelation of a new world version. Goodman's second usage of 
realism thus set up a tension between familiarity as differentiating 
the realistic work and discovery as characterising its relationship 
with world, In a third use of the term realism Goodman drew attention 
to the fact that even fiction may be realistic for although nothing is 
denoted by fiction it may be separated into, for example, 
real-person-storles and fictive-person-stories.
Gombrich's art historical account of realism operates in the area 
demarcated by Goodman's first two usages of the term. A similar 
familiarity - discovery dichotomy operates in Gombrich's Art and 
Illusion, Gombrich made the invaluable contribution of moving the 
emphasis from the issue of 'image - reality' to 'image 
viewer/artist'. Goodman's position on realism as an effect rather
4 :
than a queation of con\wrt wee reflected In Gombrioh's 'psychological 
study1 of the role of artist end viewer in achieving the realistic 
effect. In terms of familiarity Gombrich identified the expectations 
of the viewer, governed largely by previous encounters -with realist 
worKS, ana tne adherence of the artist to familiar schemata to fulfill 
those expectations. In terms of discovery Oombrtch identified the 
viewer os participant in the creation of the realist work of art and 
Vhe role of the artist se discoverer of the effects which could 
generate viewer 'projection'.
The outcome of chapters two and three was an accoint of realism that
dismissed e contents based solution to the problem of realism and
argued for familiarity and discovery as the keys Vo representational 
realism in terms of the creation of the work by ':he artist and its 
perception by the viewer.
The application of this account to film offered the opportunity to 
elucidote the concepts set out in the first part cf the dissertation 
while providing a test of its sfflcacy in dealing with a realism of 
representation unparalleled in the arts. In terms of film itself the 
success of this application would bring film into alignment with the 
other arts, refuting the eosent.lalist position of many commentators.
AndrS Bazin's realist aesthetic worked from an esse-ntialist position, 
arguing that film wnjoys unique tic with reality beuause of its 
ability to mechanically reproduce what is in front cf the lena. An 
account of realism that could nob choose between tho multiple versions 
of reality offered by realistic art would not sustain Bazin's 
position. By seeking to relate film to an antecedent reality, Bazin 
retained a relationship of dependence between film and reality that is 
not •■appropriate for an fully fledged artform. It implies that film, 
unlike the older arts, is not free to criticize or oppose reality, ea
It is not complete in itself. The 'unique nature of film1 is a
handicap Bazin would never have wished on the oiniima. Bazin was left 
with nothing more than a psychology conducive to realism in film based 
on the viewor'Q misplaced trust i.n the objectivity of the lens.

understanding.
2C01: A Space Odyssey
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